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LONG-TERM CONTRACTING THE WAY TO RENEWABLE
ENERGY INVESTMENT: LESSONS FROM BRAZIL APPLIED
TO THE UNITED STATES
ABSTRACT
Fostering development of a renewable energy industry is critical to
ensuring energy security and sustained economic development. The United
States recently lost its status as global leader in new financial investment in
renewable energy, while investment in renewable energy has increased in the
developing world. For example, Brazil is the sixth largest investor in
renewable energy and has moved up in renewable energy rankings. It is time
for the United States to regain its leadership role and create a stable climate
for renewable energy investment.
This Comment argues that the current legal framework in the United States
is inefficient in stimulating continuous investment in electricity generation
from renewable resources. The start-and-stop approach created by reliance on
tax incentives, a patchwork of state laws, and the inability of many power
producers to secure long-term power purchase agreements fail to provide
potential investors with the long-term predictability they need. An examination
of Brazil’s legal framework for investment in renewable energy demonstrates
that a mechanism that assures a certain return on investment over a long
period of time is crucial to promote continuous investment in renewable energy
projects and related industries.
This Comment ultimately recommends that the United States encourage
more continuous investment in renewable energy by adopting a national
renewable portfolio standard and requiring utilities to enter into long-term
contracts with nonutility power producers through a competitive process to
meet the requirement, unless a utility can meet it in a more cost-effective
manner by generating the required amount of renewable energy itself.
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INTRODUCTION
As of 2010, the United States still relied on fossil fuels for about 81% of its
primary energy requirements.1 In contrast, renewable resources—those that
“regenerate and can be sustained indefinitely”2—supplied about 8% of energy
consumed and electricity generated in the United States.3 Even though total
new financial investment in renewable energy in the United States has been
growing,4 the overall increase in renewable energy generation has been small
and unsteady.5 Moreover, in recent years the United States lost to China the
position of global leader in new, renewable energy investment6 and, until May
2013, the position of most attractive country for renewable energy in Ernst &
Young’s quarterly Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Indices.7
1 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0384(2011), ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, at 5 tbl.1.1 (2012)
[hereinafter ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011]. This compares with about 72% in 1978. Id.
2 Renewable Energy Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.
cfm?page=renewable_home (last updated May 25, 2012) (listing biomass, water (hydropower), geothermal,
wind, and solar as the most used renewable resources).
3 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, supra note 1, at 5 tbl.1.1. By comparison, in 1978 renewable
resources supplied about 5% of energy consumed. Id.
4 See UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME & BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN., GLOBAL TRENDS IN
RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT 2012, at 15 fig.3 (2012) [hereinafter UNEP & BNEF 2012], available at
http://fs-unep-centre.org/sites/default/files/publications/globaltrendsreport2012.pdf; UNITED NATIONS ENV’T
PROGRAMME & BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN., GLOBAL TRENDS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT 2011,
at 18 (2011) [hereinafter UNEP & BNEF 2011], available at http://fs-unep-centre.org/sites/default/files/media/
sefi2011finallowres.pdf. For example, new financial investment in renewable energy grew 58% to over $25
billion in 2010. UNEP & BNEF 2011, supra, at 9, 18 (including biofuel projects). In 2011, it grew 57% to
$50.8 billion. UNEP & BNEF 2012, supra, at 15 fig.3.
5 See supra note 3 and accompanying text; cf. Steven Ferrey, Follow the Money! Article I and Article VI
Constitutional Barriers to Renewable Energy in the U.S. Future, 17 VA. J.L. & TECH. 89, 100 (2012),
http://www.vjolt.net/vol17/issue2/v17_i2_89-Ferrey.pdf (“All policy incentives have failed to substantially
increase the deployment of renewable energy technologies on a percentage basis at the national scale.”).
6 See UNEP & BNEF 2012, supra note 4, at 15 fig.3 (showing the United States’ 2011 new investment
as $50.8 billion and China’s as $52.2 billion); Barry Stevens, Can Renewable Energy Survive in the U.S.?,
RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD.COM (Oct. 25, 2011), www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/
10/can-renewable-energy-survive-in-the-u-s.
7 In February 2013, Ernst & Young ranked the United States third most attractive country for renewable
energy, behind China and Germany. ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 36, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY
ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 16 (2013) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG FEB. 2013]. This represented a fall in the
rankings over the past few years. From August 2010 to August 2012, the United States held second place in
the same ranking. See ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 34, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES
20 (2012) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG AUG. 2012]; ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 33, RENEWABLE ENERGY
COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 20 (2012) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG MAY 2012]; ERNST & YOUNG,
ISSUE 32, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 14 (2012) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG
FEB. 2012]; ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 31, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 13 (2011)
[hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG NOV. 2011] (depicting the ranking for August 2011, as well, in parentheses next
to the November 2011 ranking); ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 29, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY
ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 15 (2011) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG MAY 2011]; ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 28,
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Slow growth of renewable energy in the United States has been attributed
to various factors, including the following: high capital costs; low power
purchase agreement (PPA) rates; inability to lock in long-term purchase
agreements; regulatory hurdles; demise of key federal incentives; and erosion
of Congress’s support for subsidies.8 Since 2008, a fall in natural gas prices has
exacerbated these barriers by promoting the building of natural gas plants and
depressing further contract terms for renewable energy projects.9
The United States’ fall to China as global leader in new, renewable energy
investment represented a trend of energy investment shifting toward
developing countries.10 In various regions of the developing world, investment
in renewable energy has increased as governments strive to diversify their
country’s energy mix.11 For example, in 2010, new financial investment in
renewable energy in South and Central America, excluding Brazil, nearly
tripled.12 Brazil itself was the world’s sixth largest investor in renewable
energy as of 2012.13 It produces almost all of the world’s sugar-based ethanol
and has been working to add more small hydroelectric, biomass, and wind
power to its energy mix.14 In fact, largely due to strong growth in its wind

RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 11 (2011); ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 27,
RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 11 (2010); ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 26,
RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 10 (2010). Moreover, previous to that Ernst &
Young ranked the United States the number one most attractive country for renewable energy. ERNST &
YOUNG, ISSUE 25, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 10 (2010); ERNST & YOUNG,
ISSUE 24, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 9 (2010). The United States was once
again given the number one spot in the May 2013 rankings. ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 37, RENEWABLE ENERGY
COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 16 (2013) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG MAY 2013]. The report attributes
this rise largely to “[h]igh barriers to entry for external investors” in China (while also pointing out that the
growth prospects for the sector in China remain strong). Id. at 5, 17. Given this explanation and the trend over
the past few years, it remains to be seen whether the United States will retain the number one spot in future
rankings.
8 Stevens, supra note 6. As an example of high capital costs, as of 2011, a solar farm cost about $3.25
per watt whereas a gas-fired electric plant cost under $1.25 per watt. Id.
9 See ERNST & YOUNG MAY 2011, supra note 7 (stating that “lack of liquidity in power offtake
arrangements remain the major barrier” to wind projects in light of low gas prices in the United States); UNEP
& BNEF 2011, supra note 4, at 16 (noting that for most of 2010, the benchmark rate for natural gas was
between $3 and $5/MMBTu, compared with $13/MMBTu in 2008).
10 See UNEP & BNEF 2011, supra note 4, at 6.
11 See id. at 17–24 (describing various government actions).
12 See id. at 23.
13 KPMG INT’L, TAXES AND INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY 13 (2012).
14 KPMG INT’L, TAXES AND INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY 3, 10 (2011).

CHACON GALLEYSPROOFS1

1568

7/11/2013 2:01 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1563

market, Brazil broke into the top ten ranked countries in Ernst & Young’s
November 2011 Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Indices.15
Around the world, countries such as Brazil, China, India, Spain, and the
United Kingdom have been working to reap the benefits that renewable energy
offers.16 Diversification of a country’s energy matrix to include more
renewable energy can promote economic development, national security, and
environmental sustainability.17 The environmental ramifications seem to be
clear. Conventional fossil fuels pollute the air and water, and they contribute to
global warming.18 Producing electricity using renewable resources can mitigate
these negative environmental effects.19 Avoiding such pollutants results in
economic benefits such as lower health care costs.20 Additional economic
benefits derive from spending more locally to build and maintain the
renewable energy facilities than on costly resource inputs from other countries

15

ERNST & YOUNG NOV. 2011, supra note 7, at 13–14. As of May 2009, Brazil was ranked number
twenty. ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 21, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 10 (2009)
[hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG MAY 2009]. Between November 2011, when Brazil first broke into the top ten,
and February 2013, Brazil’s spot in the ranking varied between number nine and number eleven. ERNST &
YOUNG MAY 2012, supra note 7 (ranking Brazil at number nine); ERNST & YOUNG FEB. 2013, supra note 7
(ranking Brazil at number 11); see also ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 35, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY
ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 21 (2012) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG NOV. 2012] (ranking Brazil at number ten);
ERNST & YOUNG AUG. 2012, supra note 7 (same); ERNST & YOUNG FEB. 2012, supra note 7 (same). Brazil’s
overall score increased from 44 to 50.5 over the same period. ERNST & YOUNG MAY 2009, supra; ERNST &
YOUNG FEB. 2013, supra note 7. In comparison, the United States’ score fell from 70 to 64.9. ERNST & YOUNG
MAY 2009, supra; ERNST & YOUNG FEB. 2013, supra note 7. In the most recent May 2013 ranking, Brazil fell
to number 15. See ERNST & YOUNG MAY 2013, supra note 7, at 16. The rankings attribute this fall to
government proposals for domestic content rules and transmission requirements for wind projects that would
likely increase project costs and intensify competition, as well as the recent cancellation of auctions. Id. at 5,
12. This fall in the rankings is clearly inconsistent with the trend of recent years. It remains to be seen whether
this fall will be permanent. The May 2013 rankings also employed a new methodology to reflect a changed
landscape for energy investment. Id. at 5. Under this new methodology, Brazil’s score rose slightly to 50.7
while the United States’ score increased to 71.6. See id. at 16. Even taking this new methodology into account,
the total increase in Brazil’s score from May 2009 to May 2013 (44 to 50.7) is greater than the total increase in
the United States’ score (70 to 71.6). Additionally, while Brazil fell in the May 2013 rankings, its total score
did not decrease.
16 See ERNST & YOUNG NOV. 2011, supra note 7, at 18–30 (discussing countries’ efforts).
17 See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction and Overview to THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY
AND RENEWABLES 1, 18 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011); Clean Energy, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/technology_and_impacts/impacts/public-benefits-of-renewable.html (last
revised Apr. 8, 2013).
18 See, e.g., Gerrard, supra note 17, at 1; Clean Energy, supra note 17.
19 Clean Energy, supra note 17.
20 See id.; cf. Gerrard, supra note 17, at 1 (reporting that urban air pollution leads to nearly 800,000
deaths worldwide each year).
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or states.21 In addition, using renewable energy reduces the country’s
vulnerability to volatile fossil fuel prices, which may benefit ratepayers by
stabilizing electricity rates.22
However, to achieve these beneficial results, special legal frameworks to
encourage investment in renewable energy are necessary because the capital
costs associated with renewable energy projects are higher than for
conventional power plants.23 The frameworks governments use vary greatly,
but they generally attempt to compensate for high costs by subsidizing
renewable energy, establishing special power-purchasing rules, and lowering
transaction costs.24 Currently, the United States encourages investment in
renewable energy largely through subsidies in the form of short-term tax
incentives and state renewable energy mandates.25
This Comment focuses on the current legal framework to encourage
investment in electricity generation from renewable resources in the United
States.26 It is premised on the fact that the United States has already decided to
promote renewable energy, as demonstrated by various measures it has
adopted to do so. It considers those laws that have been most successful in
encouraging investment in renewable energy in the United States.27 Based on
an analysis of the current U.S. legal framework and a study of Brazil’s efforts
to diversity its energy mix, which have contributed to its increasing recognition
as a renewables powerhouse, this Comment argues most specifically that the
21 See
Benefits of Renewable Energy, NEXTERA ENERGY RESOURCES, http://www.
nexteraenergyresources.com/content/environment/benefits.shtml (last visited July 1, 2013). For example, Iowa
and Massachusetts import about 97% of the energy they use. Clean Energy, supra note 17.
22 See Clean Energy, supra note 17; see also ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, supra note 1, at 215 tbl.7.9
(reporting coal prices between 1949 and 2010); Price of U.S. Natural Gas Imports, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9100us3m.htm (last updated June 28, 2013) (depicting fluctuation in
natural gas import prices between 2000 and 2012).
23 See Fredric Beck & Eric Martinot, Renewable Energy Policies and Barriers, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ENERGY 365, 366–67 (Cutler J. Cleveland ed., 2004). Furthermore, conventional sources of energy are
subsidized, making it hard for renewable energy to compete if not put on equal footing. See generally U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DIRECT FEDERAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS AND SUBSIDIES IN ENERGY IN FISCAL
YEAR 2010, at 1 (2011) (providing “a snapshot of direct federal financial interventions and subsidies in energy
markets . . . focusing on subsidies to electricity production”).
24 See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 370–76.
25 See infra Part II.B–C.
26 This Comment does not consider renewable energy in forms other than electricity and also does not
consider alternative, but not renewable, forms of energy such as nuclear.
27 It does not consider other roadblocks to developing renewable energy projects, such as siting and
environmental licensing. See generally Patricia E. Salkin, Facility Siting and Permitting, in THE LAW OF
CLEAN ENERGY, supra note 17, at 95, 95–114 (discussing siting and permitting of renewable energy projects).
These are crucial elements of facilitating the development of renewable energy and deserve separate attention.
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United States should modify the federal framework to increase access for
power producers using renewable resources to long-term PPAs with electric
utilities.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of investment programs for
renewable energy, as well as the hallmarks of an efficient renewable-energy
legal framework. Part II then analyzes the existing legal framework to promote
investment in renewable energy in the United States. It argues that the current
framework creates unnecessary investment costs and does not provide the
long-term predictability necessary to stimulate continuous investment. Part III
focuses on Brazil’s renewable energy model and Part IV draws lessons from
Brazil’s experience to apply in the United States. Finally, Part V recommends
and concludes that the United States should show its commitment to renewable
energy by adopting a national renewable portfolio standard (RPS) requiring
electric utilities to purchase, on a competitive basis through long-term
contracts with nonutility power producers, a specific percentage of the
electricity that the utilities supply to their consumers, unless a utility can
generate the required amount itself more cheaply.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT IN RENEWABLE ENERGY
While renewable energy offers many advantages, various impediments
inherent to its use stall the industry’s growth. One challenge is that most of the
costs of renewable energy projects are for “up-front capital.”28 Once in
operation, fuel costs for projects such as a solar or wind farm are minimal.29
Regardless, higher initial capital costs mean that a renewable energy project
provides less installed capacity per dollar invested, and requires greater
amounts of up-front financing, than a conventional power plant.30
Another barrier to using renewable energy is intermittency.31 Most
renewable resources are intermittent: “[t]he wind does not always blow and the
sun does not always shine.”32 Additional roadblocks stem from the level of
technological development and concerns about technical reliability of
renewable energy equipment.33
28

E.g., Gerrard, supra note 17, at 12.
See, e.g., id.
30 Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 366.
31 E.g., Gerrard, supra note 17, at 11.
32 See id.
33 See Braden W. Penhoet, Financing Structures and Transactions, in THE LAW
supra note 17, at 241, 242.
29
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The unique risks and high capital costs reduce the amount of affordable
financing available to renewable energy projects and make an effective legal
framework to stimulate investment that much more important.34 Financing, the
tools used to encourage investment in renewable energy, and the hallmarks of
an effective renewable-energy legal framework are discussed below in Parts
I.A to I.C, respectively.
A. Financing a Renewable Energy Project
Facilities producing electrical energy from renewable resources may be
constructed and operated by various types of entities, including nonutility
power producers. An independent power producer (IPP), for example, is an
independent generator of electricity that uses the transmission facilities of
utilities to deliver power to customers.35 It sells its power with authorization
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and its service
obligation is defined by the terms of its power sales contracts—usually a PPA
with a utility or third party.36 The PPA sets forth the obligations of the power
producer and power purchaser, as well as the price the power producer will
receive.37
Renewable energy projects often require equity and debt financing.38 Power
producers that do not have enough tax liabilities to take advantage of the large
tax incentives available in the United States find tax equity investors who do.39
A tax equity investor contributes capital in return for tax benefits equal to the
capital contribution and a return on the investment.40 Thus, potential returns
from a renewable energy project must be predictable enough to entice
investment.41

34

See id. at 241.
Electric Power Industry Overview 2007, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/
page/prim2/toc2.html (last visited July 1, 2013).
36 Id.
37 E.g., Craig M. Kline, Solar, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY, supra note 17, at 391, 409.
38 See generally Penhoet, supra note 33, at 242–57 (discussing various financing structures).
39 E.g., PAUL SCHWABE ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., NREL/TP-6A2-44930, RENEWABLE
ENERGY PROJECT FINANCING: IMPACTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION 2–3 (2009).
40 Id. at 5.
41 Cf. MICHAEL MENDELSOHN & JOHN HARPER, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., NREL/TP-6A2053720, § 1603 TREASURY GRANT EXPIRATION: INDUSTRY INSIGHT ON FINANCING AND MARKET IMPLICATIONS
18 (2012) (“As a general rule . . . tax equity investors are conservative in their tolerance for risk.”).
35
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One common way to use debt to finance a renewable energy project is
called “project finance.”42 Project finance allows an entity to manage risk by
isolating substantial project-related debts in a separate entity.43 Under these
structures, project revenues alone repay the loan.44 As such, project lenders
need high levels of confidence in the project’s ability to generate reliable
revenue over the course of the loan.45
Therefore, both creditors and equity investors require evidence of a
project’s ability to generate consistent and sufficient levels of revenue.
Commitments from customers, such as in the form of a PPA, are often key to
securing both debt and equity financing.46
B. Mechanisms Used to Encourage Investment in Renewable Energy
Given the financing needs of renewable energy projects, governments
around the world use legal frameworks to promote investment in renewable
energy.47 The frameworks differ to some extent but are largely variations on
and combinations of a standard set of tools.48
As Part II discusses, the most significant tools in the United States are tax
incentives and state RPSs. RPSs encourage investment in renewable energy by
requiring utilities to source a percentage of the electricity they sell from
renewable resources or purchase renewable energy credits (RECs) from other
sources to meet the quota.49 Tax incentives, on the other hand, attempt to drive
investment in renewable energy by making its development more economically
attractive to investors.50
Differently, feed-in tariffs (FITs) and auctions focus on ensuring that power
producers using renewable resources (“renewable-energy power producers”)
will be able to sell the electricity they generate over a period of time at a

42

E.g., Penhoet, supra note 33, at 255–56.
Id. at 255.
44 See id. at 256.
45 Id.
46 E.g., id.
47 See, e.g., KPMG INT’L, supra note 13, at 6–49.
48 See, e.g., Gerrard, supra note 17, at 14–18; see also KPMG INT’L, supra note 13, at 1.
49 E.g., Joshua P. Fershee, Renewables Mandates and Goals, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY, supra note
17, at 77, 77; see also infra Part II.C.
50 See, e.g., KPMG INT’L, supra note 13, at 1; infra Part II.B.
43
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certain price.51 The tools differ in that FITs generally require utilities to buy
electricity from renewable energy projects at a government-mandated price
above the market rate, whereas under an auction system renewable-energy
power producers bid for contracts and only those bidders offering the lowest
price actually secure a contract.52 These tools are discussed in Part III since
Brazil has experience with both.
C. The Hallmarks of an Effective Renewable Energy Investment Framework
Generally, a legal framework that fosters long-term investment is one that
investors perceive as stable and predictable.53 The framework also must not
unnecessarily increase the costs or risks of doing business.54
In accordance with these general investment principles, to effectively
promote investment in renewable energy, a government’s legal framework
must be simple, consistent, and predictable.55 It must set the stage for investors
to earn a high enough return to compensate for any uncertainties so that the
renewable energy project can secure financing.56 The framework can do so in
part by eliminating unnecessary costs.57 A long-term guarantee to purchase

51 See Toby Couture, Feed-in Tariffs or Bidding: How Best to Assign Renewable Contracts, WINDWORKS.ORG (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.wind-works.org/cms/index.php?id=39&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=
1225&cHash=0cab70c9655f6cff7f295123e2e136e4 (comparing FITs and auctions and noting that successful
bidders in auctions are awarded contracts).
52 Id.; see also infra Part III.A–B. As noted, legal frameworks often utilize a combination of these tools.
For example, the California Public Utilities Commission authorized a renewable auction mechanism to procure
renewable energy from small projects eligible for the California RPS Program. Decision Adopting the
Renewable Auction Mechanism, Decision 10-12-048, Rulemaking 08-08-009, at 2 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n
Dec. 17, 2010). The purpose was, among others, to promote competition and secure low costs for ratepayers,
and to contribute to short-term RPS goals. Id.
53 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Role of International Investment
Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries, 15, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5 (2009) [hereinafter UNCTAD]; see also Treaty Concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4, 2005, T.I.A.S. No. 06-1101 (“Agreeing that a
stable framework for investment will maximize effective utilization of economic resources and improve living
standards”).
54 See UNCTAD, supra note 53, at 40.
55 E.g., TOBY D. COUTURE ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., NREL/TP-6A2-44849, A
POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE TO FEED-IN TARIFF POLICY DESIGN 11 (2010); Randall Swisher & Kevin Porter,
Renewable Policy Lessons from the US: The Need for Consistent and Stable Policies, in RENEWABLE ENERGY
POLICY AND POLITICS: A HANDBOOK FOR DECISION-MAKING 185, 185 (Karl Mallon ed., 2006).
56 E.g., DIMITRIS N. CHORAFAS, ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT, NATURAL RESOURCES AND BUSINESS
COMPETITIVENESS: THE FRAGILITY OF INTERDEPENDENCE 90 (2011).
57 See Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, 42 ENVTL. L. 681, 711,
713–14 (2012); cf. UNCTAD, supra note 53, at 40 (noting a study in which the authors hypothesized that
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electricity generated by the project can help by increasing investment
security.58 The long-term contract can mitigate risk by immunizing investors
against future changes that would affect revenue generation.59
The following Part demonstrates that the United States, through its reliance
on tax incentives and state RPSs, fails to provide the simple, long-term, and
predictable framework developers need to secure the lowest cost financing
possible.60
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES
There are numerous federal laws encouraging the use and development of
renewable energy in the United States.61 Yet a few of these laws impact
investment in renewable energy projects more significantly than the rest.62
While these laws have led to investment in renewable energy, they have failed
to create a stable and predictable investment environment in which investment
occurs continuously.63 To complement the federal framework, states have
enacted their own renewable energy laws.64 These laws have increased

having more host-country bilateral investment treaties reduced costs associated with long-term capital
investment in the host country, which led, in turn, to increased foreign direct investment).
58 Karsten Neuhoff, Large-Scale Deployment of Renewables for Electricity Generation, in THE NEW
ENERGY PARADIGM 288, 314 (Dieter Helm ed., 2007); see also Decision Adopting the Renewable Auction
Mechanism, Decision 10-12-048, Rulemaking 08-08-009, at 14 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Dec. 17, 2010)
(listing the goals of (1) lowering transaction costs and (2) executing contracts for financeable prices when
setting the auction prices mechanism).
59 Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 314.
60 See Ronald H. Rosenberg, Harmonious Federalism in Support of National Energy Goals—Increased
Wind Renewable Energy, 85 N.D. L. REV. 781, 793–94, 805–06 (2009) (noting that there is no long-term
federal strategy to promote wind energy).
61 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 902(a) (2012) (allowing the Secretary of Agriculture to make loans for renewable
energy systems under a rural electrification program); 10 U.S.C. § 2922b (2012) (requiring the secretary of a
military department to procure systems that use renewable energy whenever possible and practical); 42 U.S.C.
§ 15852 (2006) (mandating that at least 7.5% of electrical energy the federal government consumes must be
renewable by the 2013 fiscal year).
62 See, e.g., DIPA SHARIF ET AL., BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN., THE RETURN—AND RETURNS—OF TAX
EQUITY FOR US RENEWABLE PROJECTS 1 (2011); RYAN WISER ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB.,
LBNL-63583, USING THE FEDERAL PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT TO BUILD A DURABLE MARKET FOR WIND
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2007).
63 E.g., Swisher & Porter, supra note 55; Stevens, supra note 6.
64 See infra Part II.C.
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renewable energy generation but have also resulted in a patchwork that makes
compliance complex and costly.65
Overall, the current U.S. legal framework does not provide the long-term
stability developers of renewable energy projects need to secure low-cost
financing (or often any financing at all). This Part demonstrates the need to
overhaul the current framework to ensure a stable environment in which
renewable-energy power producers have access to long-term PPAs.66 Section
A addresses the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA). PURPA
initially spurred investment but has failed to do so recently,67 causing greater
reliance on federal tax incentives.68 Those tax incentives are explored in
section B. Last, section C considers some of the mechanisms states have
adopted to promote renewable energy development.
A. PURPA: An Antiquated Approach to Encouraging Renewable Energy
Investment
PURPA stimulated investment in renewable energy by creating a market
for small power producers.69 It was enacted in 1978 in response to
“skyrocketing prices for energy, high inflation, economic stagnation, and
dependence on [foreign oil].”70 Among Congress’s findings when enacting the
legislation were the following:
[T]he protection of the public health, safety, and welfare, the
preservation of national security, and the proper exercise of
congressional authority under the Constitution to regulate interstate
commerce require[d]—

65 Mormann, supra note 57, at 725–26; Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress Got It
Wrong: The Case for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for Policy, 3 ENVTL. &
ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 85, 88 (2008).
66 See Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 314; Stevens, supra note 6.
67 See Eric Martinot et al., Renewable Energy Policies and Markets in the United States, CENTER FOR
RESOURCE SOLUTIONS, http://www.resource-solutions.org/lib/librarypdfs/IntPolicy-RE.policies.markets.US.
pdf (last visited June 15, 2013) (noting that “PURPA’s influence faded in the 1990s”); Public Utility
Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/
solutions/big_picture_solutions/public-utility-regulatory.html (last visited July 1, 2013).
68 Cf. SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62 (“Tax credits are likely to again become the most important subsidies
supporting renewable project development in the [United States] . . . .”).
69 E.g., Richard F. Hirsh, PURPA: The Spur to Competition and Utility Restructuring, ELECTRICITY J.,
Aug.–Sept. 1999, at 60, 63–64; Or. Dep’t of Energy, Federal Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978
(PURPA): Update March 2006, OREGON.GOV (Mar. 2006), http://www.oregon.gov/energy/RENEW/docs/
PURPA_update_March06.pdf; Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), supra note 67.
70 Hirsh, supra note 69, at 61–62.
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(1) a program providing for increased conservation of electric
energy, increased efficiency in the use of facilities and resources by
electric utilities, and equitable retail rates for electric consumers,
(2) a program to improve the wholesale distribution of electric
energy [and] the reliability of electric service . . .
....
(4) a program for the conservation of natural gas while insuring
71
that rates to natural gas consumers are equitable . . . .

As part of its efforts to achieve these goals, Congress created a class of
qualifying facilities (QFs), including cogenerators72 and small power producers
using renewable resources, which would receive special rate treatment.73
PURPA directed FERC74 to prescribe rules requiring electric utilities to
offer to purchase electricity from QFs.75 It specified that the purchase rates
paid to QFs “be just and reasonable to the electric consumers of the electric
utility and in the public interest” and “not discriminate against” the QFs.76
However, no rule could require a utility to pay a rate that “exceeds the
incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative electric energy.”77
As implemented, QFs can sell to a utility at the utility’s avoided cost or at
another negotiated rate.78 The utility’s “[a]voided cost is the incremental cost
to [the] electric utility of electric energy or capacity which, but for the
purchase from the QF, such utility would generate itself or purchase from
71 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA), Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 2, 92 Stat. 3117, 3119
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006)).
72 A cogeneration facility produces electric energy and steam or other forms of useful energy for
“industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling purposes.” 16 U.S.C. § 796(18)(A).
73 PURPA § 210, 92 Stat. at 3144–47 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3); What is a Qualifying
Facility?, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/whatis.asp (last updated Feb. 3, 2012).
74 FERC has jurisdiction over wholesale power transactions and prices. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1); Steven
Ferrey et al., Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon Control Mechanisms Confront
Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 125, 180 (2010).
75 PURPA § 210(a), 92 Stat. at 3144 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a)). The Energy Policy
Act of 2005 repealed the mandatory purchase requirement for areas with independent transmission operators
and viable spot markets. Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 1253(a), § 210(m)(1), 119 Stat. 594, 967–68 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 824a-3(m)(1)); Or. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 69.
76 PURPA § 210(b), 92 Stat. at 3144 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)).
77 Id. The incremental cost is “the cost to the electric utility of the electric energy which, but for the
purchase from such cogenerator or small power producer, such utility would generate or purchase from
another source.” PURPA § 210(d), 92 Stat. at 3145 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(d)).
78 What Are the Benefits of QF Status?, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/benefits.asp (last updated Feb. 3, 2012).
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another source.”79 At the same time, FERC’s rules allowed each state to
develop its own method to calculate avoided cost80 and determine whether to
require long-term contracts.81 Not requiring long-term contracts is problematic
because nonutility power producers need long-term contracts to attract
affordable financing.82
Although PURPA initially stimulated investment in renewable energy, its
structure is wrought with problems and it is no longer as effective.83 The first
problem is that wide state discretion resulted in a patchwork of implementation
methodologies.84 California, for example, established a generous regime
assuring QFs a fixed rate over a ten-year period.85 The rates granted reflected
the belief that oil costs (and avoided costs) would escalate.86 When oil prices
fell, the utilities had to continue paying QFs the high rate contracted for even
though their avoided costs had fallen with oil and gas prices.87 In other states,
utilities had broad authority to determine the inputs on which avoided cost
calculations were based.88 This discretion “create[d] inconsistency and
put[] . . . downward pressure on avoided cost rates.”89 Yet another set of states
implemented bidding schemes under which QFs bid for a certain amount of
capacity.90

79

Id.
CAROLYN ELEFANT, REVIVING PURPA’S PURPOSE: THE LIMITS OF EXISTING STATE AVOIDED COST
RATEMAKING METHODOLOGIES IN SUPPORTING ALTERNATIVE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND A PROPOSED PATH
FOR REFORM 10–36 (2011), available at http://lawofficesofcarolynelefant.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/
Elefant_Reviving_PURPA_Avoided_Costs_2011-dated.pdf (discussing state methodologies); Swisher &
Porter, supra note 55, at 186–88 (same); see also 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e) (2012) (establishing factors that must
be considered “to the extent practicable” when determining avoided costs).
81 See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d) (stating that each QF “shall have the option either” of providing energy as
available or under a contract for a “specified term”).
82 ELEFANT, supra note 80, at 3; see also COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at viii–ix (“Longer contract
periods help lower levelized payments, ensure cost recovery, lower the cost of financing, and increase investor
confidence.”); Stevens, supra note 6.
83 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), supra note 67; see also Fershee, supra note 49, at 77
(stating that PURPA’s role has largely been supplanted by state RPSs).
84 See ELEFANT, supra note 80.
85 E.g., Martinot et al., supra note 67. The contract was for fifteen to thirty years, but the price was fixed
for ten. Id.
86 Hirsh, supra note 69, at 63.
87 See id.
88 ELEFANT, supra note 80, at 2–3.
89 Id.
90 Hirsh, supra note 69, at 66. State regulators and FERC appeared to view auctions as “compatible with
the spirit and letter of PURPA.” Id.
80

CHACON GALLEYSPROOFS1

1578

7/11/2013 2:01 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1563

With respect to contracts, many jurisdictions did not require long-term
contracts.91 Idaho, for example, originally required twenty-year contracts, but
later modified that to five-year contracts due to unwillingness to commit to
high prices.92 Evidently, FERC’s guidelines did not result in uniform practices.
One commentator noted that avoided-cost ratemaking has confounded
developers and regulators alike due to its “Byzantine nature . . . at the state
level.”93 Thus, wide state discretion created a complex system that does not
provide investors the predictability they need to make long-term investment
decisions.
The other major problem with PURPA is its setting avoided cost as the
highest price that a utility could be required to pay a QF. When oil and gas
prices are high, avoided cost rates may be sufficient to promote investment in
renewable energy.94 In recent years, however, the price of oil has declined and
natural gas supplies have increased, greatly lowering the avoided cost for
utilities.95 Avoided cost calculations generally do not consider extrinsic costs
such as environmental degradation.96 Were these extrinsic costs included, the
avoided cost would increase, making renewable energy more competitive.97 In
most states, however, such a low cap does not assure investors of adequate
return on their investment.98 Although utilities could agree to a higher rate, it is
tough to convince a utility to pay a higher price unless otherwise required.99

91

ELEFANT, supra note 80, at 33–36.
See Martinot et al., supra note 67. The optimal contract length for renewable energy projects is, on
average, at least twenty years. See infra Part IV.A.
93 ELEFANT, supra note 80, at 2.
94 See Martinot et al., supra note 67.
95 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), supra note 67; see also Beck & Martinot, supra note
23, at 371 (stating that by the 1990s, energy prices had not risen as expected and new natural-gas-fired
generation came on-line, causing renewable energy to be less competitive).
96 See Ferrey et al., supra note 74, at 142.
97 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), supra note 67.
98 COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at 17. PURPA is sometimes considered the original FIT policy. Id. at
9; Martinot et al., supra note 67. FITS are the most widely used policy in the world to accelerate renewable
energy deployment. E.g., COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at 1. Typical FITs reduce risk of investment in
renewable energy by guaranteeing access to the electric grid, providing stable long-term PPAs, and setting
payment levels based on the cost of renewable energy generation. Id. at vi. Thus, PURPA does not share the
characteristics of most effective FITs.
99 Cf. Ferrey et al., supra note 74, at 201 (noting that a utility that voluntarily agrees to a rate above
avoided cost may be faced with a legal challenge as “‘imprudent’”); Erin Dewey, Note, Sundown and You
Better Take Care: Why Sunset Provisions Harm the Renewable Energy Industry and Violate Tax Principles,
52 B.C. L. REV. 1105, 1113 (2011) (arguing that utilities will not enter long-term contracts for renewable
energy when the short-term price for traditional energy is lower).
92
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B. Tax Incentives: Creating a Boom-and-Bust Investment Cycle
Along with PURPA, the federal government began adopting tax incentives
to encourage investment in renewable energy projects. The primary tax
incentives include the Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC)100 and the
Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC).101 These credits have
been in place for several years102 and have been renewed and modified
multiple times.103 At times they have been complemented by additional tax
incentives or non-tax incentive schemes.104 Reliance on an “on-again, offagain” tax system creates an unstable investment environment in which entities
hesitate to make long-term investment decisions leading up to the credit’s
expiration, resulting in a boom-and-bust cycle.105
The PTC provides a tax credit based on the amount of electricity produced
from renewable energy projects and sold by the taxpayer during a ten-year
period.106 The PTC expires in different years depending on the technology
used.107 It is generally renewed for only a couple of years and, on three
occasions, was allowed to expire first, leaving a gap in coverage.108
100 I.R.C. § 48 (Supp. III 2010); see also Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC), DSIRE,
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US02F (last updated Jan. 3, 2013)
[hereinafter DSIRE ITC].
101 I.R.C. § 38(b)(8) (2006); id. § 45 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); see also Renewable Electricity Production
Tax Credit (PTC), DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US13F&re=
1&ee=1 (last updated Apr. 16, 2013) [hereinafter DSIRE PTC]. There are various other tax incentives for
renewable energy. One important one is accelerated depreciation under the Modified Accelerated Cost
Recovery System, which benefits investors by allowing them to deduct a larger depreciation expense early on
leading to a lower taxable income. MINTZ LEVIN COHN FERRIS GLOVSKY & POPEO PC, RENEWABLE ENERGY
PROJECT FINANCE IN THE U.S.: AN OVERVIEW AND MIDTERM OUTLOOK 10 (2010) [hereinafter MINTZ LEVIN],
available at http://www.greentechmedia.com/images/wysiwyg/reports/MintzLevin-WP-Web-Final-1(2).pdf.
Another tax credit, the Qualified Advanced Energy Project Credit, was adopted in 2009 and provides a 30%
credit for any project that re-equips, expands, or establishes a facility to manufacture property that produces
renewable energy. I.R.C. § 48C (Supp. III 2010).
102 The PTC is the newer of the two credits and has been in place since 1992. See DSIRE PTC, supra note
101 (discussing the recent changes to the credit).
103 E.g., id.; DSIRE ITC, supra note 100 (discussing the credit’s history).
104 See generally SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 1–5; Roberta F. Mann & E. Margaret Rowe, Taxation,
in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY, supra note 17, at 145 (discussing renewable energy tax policy); supra text
accompanying note 101.
105 Dewey, supra note 99, at 1127 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord ERNST & YOUNG MAY
2012, supra note 7, at 25; Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 188–89.
106 I.R.C. § 45. The PTC is indexed to inflation and is currently $.02/kilowatt hour (kWh) or $.01/kWh,
depending on the technology used. DSIRE PTC, supra note 101.
107 See I.R.C. § 45.
108 E.g., DSIRE PTC, supra note 101. For example, the PTC expired at the end of 2003 and was not
renewed until October 2004. Id.
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Different from the PTC, which is based on actual energy production, the
ITC allows businesses to receive a one-time federal income tax credit of 30%
of the amount invested in a renewable energy project.109 Generally, a qualified
project must be placed in service before 2017.110 Congress expanded the ITC
under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 in
response to the economic downturn.111 The ARRA changes were significant
because they allowed taxpayers eligible for a PTC to elect the ITC instead.112
Thus, some facilities otherwise not qualified for an ITC may currently take it if
it is more advantageous.113
Tax incentives such as the ITC and PTC are often referred to as tax
expenditures114 and are commonly used to induce certain behaviors.115
Although they do stimulate investment, academics have questioned the
efficacy of their use.116 One problem is that they distort market prices and
behavior because they encourage investments based on the tax savings
generated rather than on the activity’s economic merit.117 Another problem is
that they are difficult to target effectively—they generally apply to all business
activity of a particular type.118 In many cases, a tax incentive may be necessary
to encourage one player to act but not another.119

109

I.R.C. § 48 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). For certain technologies it is only 10% and for some it is capped.
Id.; DSIRE ITC, supra note 100.
110 I.R.C. § 48; DSIRE ITC, supra note 100.
111 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, secs. 1102–1104,
§ 48, 123 Stat. 115, 319–21; see also DSIRE ITC, supra note 100 (explaining ARRA’s changes to the ITC).
112 ARRA sec. 1102, 123 Stat. at 319. A taxpayer may only use one of the tax credits. See I.R.C.
§ 48(a)(5)(B).
113 I.R.C. § 48(a)(5). Additionally, certain technologies originally eligible only for the 10% ITC are now
eligible for a 30% ITC. See id.
114 The concept was introduced by Professor Stanley Surrey. Miles Mogulescu, Note, The Tax Reform Act
of 1976 and Tax Incentives for Motion Picture Investment: Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 839, 842 n.22 (1985). Professor Surrey compared tax expenditures to direct expenditures and
argued that if the government decides to assist a particular activity, it should do so with a direct expenditure
unless there is a “clear and compelling” advantage to using a tax incentive. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives
as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83
HARV. L. REV. 705, 734 (1970).
115 Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget
and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010).
116 E.g., id. at 8–10; Surrey, supra note 114, at 726.
117 Kleinbard, supra note 115, at 8; Mogulescu, supra note 114, at 842.
118 Kleinbard, supra note 115, at 20.
119 Id.
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Additionally, tax incentives are inequitable because not all players benefit
equally.120 Tax incentives are most valuable to those taxpayers with high
taxable incomes.121 For example, a start-up that does not yet have any profits is
unable to take advantage of an income tax credit like a Fortune 500 company
that regularly turns a large profit can.122
These criticisms of tax incentives apply in the renewable energy context.
Power producers that do not have tax liability can use the tax credits by
securing equity investment from taxpayers who do.123 Nevertheless, while a
portion of the tax benefits is passed on to the power producer, it comes at the
cost of legal fees to make the contractual arrangements and the return on
investment required by the equity investors.124 For small projects these
additional costs could be prohibitive.125 Thus, reliance on the ITC and PTC
creates inequity and breaks one of the hallmarks of an effective investment
framework by creating unnecessary costs.126 It also distorts the market for
renewable energy by allowing renewable-energy power producers to sell
electricity at a cost that does not reflect the true price.127
Equally as important, reliance on the ITC and PTC to promote investment
in renewable energy is problematic because it does not provide long-term
predictability. As evidence, Congress’s short-term approach has led to large
investments in renewable energy during the years investors are certain their
projects will qualify for a tax credit and much less investment in other years.128
Consider investment in wind energy. The PTC expired at the end of 2003.129
Almost four times as much wind energy capacity was installed in 2003 as in

120

Surrey, supra note 114, at 720.
Id.
122 Cf. id. at 721 (comparing the effects of five-year amortization on a taxpayer in the 70% bracket with
the effect on a taxpayer in the 20% bracket).
123 E.g., SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 3, 24. See generally Mann & Rowe, supra note 104, at 145–47
(discussing various tax equity structures).
124 See Penhoet, supra note 33, at 256 (“Enabling high-cost . . . project finance requires a complex series
of agreements and ancillary documents . . . .”); see also SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 1.
125 See Mormann, supra note 57, at 713–14; see also SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 24.
126 See Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 189 (noting that inefficiencies of the PTC add substantial costs
to development).
127 See Drew Thornley, Texas Wind Energy: Past, Present, and Future, 4 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J.
69, 98–100 (2009); cf. Kleinbard, supra note 115, at 8 (“Many tax expenditures, particularly those that are
designed as business incentives, thus distort market prices . . . .”); Mann & Rowe, supra note 104, at 161 (“Tax
incentives reduce the relative price of renewable energy . . . .”); Martinot et al., supra note 67.
128 E.g., SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 1; Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 188–89.
129 E.g., Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 188.
121
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2004—1,766 megawatts (MW) versus 467 MW.130 The credit was renewed in
October 2004 and 2,017 MW of wind energy capacity were installed in
2005.131
The wind PTC was again set to expire at the end of 2012.132 Even though
Congress has renewed the credit repeatedly, there is always a risk that
Congress may not renew it,133 especially in the recent political climate with a
Congress fixated on reducing the deficit.134 Ultimately, the PTC was extended
under the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (H.R. 8)—the bill passed on
January 1, 2013 to avert the “fiscal cliff.”135 Once again, however, the
extension is short term—just one year136—and did not occur in time to avoid a
negative impact on the wind industry.137 It has been reported that uncertainty
over the past year regarding the extension has “halted development of new
wind projects” and “layoffs had already begun” due to lack of demand.138
The start-and-stop approach to investment prohibits more robust
development of renewables for three primary reasons. First, investors hesitate
to make long-term commitments when the future of the tax credit is
uncertain.139 This applies to both renewable energy projects and any related

130 SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 4; accord Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 188 (reporting that
1,687 MW of wind were installed in 2003 and only 389 MW in 2004).
131 SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 4. For more information on the effect of PTC expiration on wind
energy development, see Wind Energy Tax Credit Set to Expire at the End of 2012, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8870, which depicts it graphically
from the PTC’s enactment in 1992 through 2012.
132 I.R.C. § 45(d)(1) (Supp. IV 2011).
133 Mormann, supra note 57, at 712; see also Dewey, supra note 99, at 1122 (noting the difference
between Congress’s acting to repeal a statute and letting a statute expire).
134 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, Dwindling Deficit Disorder, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2013, at A21.
135 Wind PTC Extension Approved as Lawmakers Strike Fiscal Cliff Package Deal, POWER (Jan. 3,
2013), http://www.powermag.com/news/5284.html.
136 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, sec. 407(a), § 45, 126 Stat. 2313, 2340–
41 (2013). The bill did provide some additional relief for most technologies, including wind, however by
merely requiring construction to begin by the expiration of the statute rather than for the project to be placed in
service by the expiration of the statute as previously required. I.R.C. § 45(d); American Taxpayer Relief Act
sec. 407(a).
137 Wind PTC Extension Approved as Lawmakers Strike Fiscal Cliff Package Deal, supra note 135.
138 Id.
139 See Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives: The Evidence
Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 68 (2006) (arguing that tax
incentives should be left in place for at least ten years to be most effective); Wind PTC Extension Approved as
Lawmakers Strike Fiscal Cliff Package Deal, supra note 135 (citing the American Wind Energy Association in
saying that uncertainty over continuation of the PTC halted development of new wind projects in the United
States).
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manufacturing industry.140 So the country misses out not only on investment in
more renewable energy projects, but also on the economic benefits that a stable
renewable-energy manufacturing industry could provide.141
Second, the short-term nature of tax credits makes projects more costly.142
Because of the risk that the tax scheme may be modified before a project
becomes eligible, investors may require higher payments to ensure the projects
at least break even.143 Also, competition for materials increases as developers
seek to install new capacity at the same time (before the tax credit expires),
driving up prices.144
Lastly, reliance on tax incentives fails to generate stable financing for
renewable energy because fewer entities can use tax credits during economic
downturns. For example, the economic decline of 2008 eliminated the demand
for tax credits.145 Tax credits only stimulate investment if enough entities have
tax liability to use them.146 The federal government recognized this problem
and, in response, adopted cash grant147 and accelerated loan guarantee
schemes.148
Under ARRA’s Section 1603 cash grant program, developers of renewable
energy projects could receive a cash grant equivalent to 30% of the capital
140 Karl Mallon, Myths, Pitfalls and Oversights, in RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY AND POLITICS, supra
note 55, at 5, 24−25 (explaining that policy schemes that create a “boom–bust cycle” or “sunset” problem are
inefficient for both the manufacturing and renewable energy industries).
141 See id. (noting that a boom–bust cycle is the antithesis of what is necessary to establish
manufacturing); cf. Wind PTC Extension Approved as Lawmakers Strike Fiscal Cliff Package Deal, supra note
135 (noting layoffs in the wind energy manufacturing sector).
142 See WISER ET AL., supra note 62, at 5 (“[T]here is reason to believe that this increase in the cost of
wind power has been exacerbated by the erratic boom-and-bust cycle created by the 1- to 2-year PTC
extensions in recent years.”).
143 E.g., Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 315.
144 Dewey, supra note 99, at 1128; Chris Gadomski, Challenges Ahead for the US Wind Industry,
MODERNPOWERSYSTEMS (Aug. 1, 2005), http://www.modernpowersystems.com/features/featurechallengesahead-for-the-us-wind-industry (reporting information provided by the American Wind Energy Association);
cf. Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 96 (noting that new state RPS mandates drive up prices by creating
“unexpected surges in demand”). But see WISER ET AL., supra note 62, at 10 (reporting that survey respondents
did not expect the length of PTC extensions to affect raw material costs).
145 SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 4; see also Wind Energy Tax Credit Set to Expire at the End of 2012,
supra note 131 (“The break in this growth streak occurred in 2010, as an echo effect of the financial crisis and
recession from late 2008 and 2009. While wind projects were still eligible for tax credits, a lack of investors
with sufficient tax appetite, or tax-situation ability to take advantage of the credits . . . contributed to slower
growth for wind capacity in 2010.”).
146 SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 4.
147 Id.; Mann & Rowe, supra note 104, at 147.
148 Kassia Yanosek, Policies for Financing the Energy Transition, DÆDALUS, Spring 2012, at 94, 99−100.
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costs of the project instead of taking a tax credit.149 However, this provision
had only a short-lived effect. Project construction had to commence by 2011150
and the scheme has since expired.151 ARRA also established the Section 1705
temporary loan guarantee program to promote rapid deployment of renewable
energy projects using commercial technologies.152 It authorized loan
guarantees for facilities that commenced construction prior to October 1,
2011.153 This program has also not been renewed.154
Congress’s adoption of the cash grant and loan guarantee programs is
evidence that tax incentives do not create a stable investment environment.
Nevertheless, the programs have fallen victim to the whims of Congress in
large part due to concerns about their cost.155
C. State Mechanisms Promoting Investment in Renewable Energy
To supplement federal legislation, state legislatures and regulatory bodies
have adopted numerous measures to encourage investment in renewable
energy.156 For example, as of 2011, most states had at least one state or local
tax incentive targeting renewable energy.157 By way of an example of a nontax incentive, several states have joined regional gas emission reduction
initiatives, which allow states to compete to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG)
149 ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1603, 123 Stat. 115, 364–66 (2009). Like with the ITC, the cap is 10%
for certain technologies. Id.
150 Originally, the grant was only available to projects that began construction before 2011, but the Tax
Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 extended the program for one
year. Pub. L. No. 111-312, sec. 707, § 1603, 124 Stat. 3296, 3312.
151 Id.
152 ARRA sec. 406; MINTZ LEVIN, supra note 101, at 10. Section 1705’s Federal Loan Guarantee Program
was adopted in 2005 to promote the development of clean energy projects using innovative technology; in
2009, Congress expanded its scope to include commercial-ready renewable energy projects. John A. Herrick,
Government Nontax Incentives for Clean Energy, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY, supra note 17, at 169, 189;
Yanosek, supra note 148. It helps companies obtain affordable financing by guaranteeing loans for up to 80%
of a project’s capital costs if the project avoids, reduces, or sequesters air pollutants or greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, or if it employs an innovative technology. See 42 U.S.C. § 16512−16513 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
153 42 U.S.C. § 16516 (Supp. IV 2011).
154 Section 1705 became the subject of much criticism when Solyndra, a solar company that had received
a $535 million loan guarantee, declared bankruptcy. E.g., ERNST &YOUNG AUG. 2012, supra note 7, at 25.
155 See Daniel R. Cahoy, Investor Enclosure: Abdicating the Green Technology Landscape, 49 AM. BUS.
L.J. 805, 843 (2012); Latest U.S. Legislation Fails to Provide Extension for Cash-Grant Program, SOLAR
INDUSTRY (Dec. 27, 2011), http://solarindustrymag.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.9396.
156 E.g., THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY, supra note 17, app. at 559–618; State Actions on Clean Energy: A
Fifty-State Survey, COLUMBIA L. SCH. CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., http://web.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/resources/law-clean-energy/state-actions-clean-energy-fifty-state-survey (last updated June 26, 2011).
157 Mann & Rowe, supra note 104, at 155.
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emissions and earn funds to invest in renewable energy.158 Additionally,
several states have “clean energy funds,” consisting of monies collected
through additional charges levied on public utility bills.159 The funds help
finance the use of clean energy.160
The most significant state measure is the RPS.161 An RPS requires electric
utilities to source a fraction of their electricity from renewable resources or
purchase renewable energy credits (RECs) from other sources to meet the
quota.162 An RPS generally sets a mid- to long-range goal and phases it in over
time.163 Entities that do not comply pay a penalty.164 Currently, twenty-nine
states and the District of Columbia have a mandatory RPS.165 For example,
California requires utilities to procure 33% of the electricity they deliver from
renewable resources by 2020.166 Eight states have renewable portfolio goals,
which is a voluntary RPS.167
Even though state RPSs have stimulated large amounts of investment,168
reliance on them is inefficient because they create a patchwork of differing
state requirements.169 For example, even in those states that have adopted an
RPS, the requirements vary by precise goal170 and even in the way they define
158 Herrick, supra note 152, at 196. Examples include the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, REGIONAL
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, www.rggi.org (last visited July 1, 2013), and the Western Climate Initiative, W.
CLIMATE INITIATIVE INC., http://www.wci-inc.org (last visited July 1, 2013).
159 Herrick, supra note 152, at 197.
160 See id.; State Clean Energy Funds Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, www.epa.gov/chp/
policies/funds_fs.html (last updated Apr. 2009).
161 E.g., Fershee, supra note 49, at 77; Martinot et al., supra note 67.
162 E.g., Fershee, supra note 49, at 77.
163 E.g., id. For example, when California first passed its RPS in 2002, it required utilities to increase their
procurement of eligible renewable energy sources by at least 1% of retail sales per year, until reaching 20%.
S.B. 1078, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).
164 E.g., Fershee, supra note 49, at 78.
165 E.g., January 2013 Archive of RPS Data, DSIRE, www.dsireusa.org/rpsdata/index.cfm (last visited
June 16, 2013) [hereinafter DSIRE RPS Data Spreadsheet].
166 See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25740 (West Supp. 2011). California’s RPS was originally 20% by 2017.
Cal. S.B. 1078. The deadline to reach 20% was later accelerated to 2010. S.B. 107, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2006). In 2011, the requirement was increased to 33% by 2020. S.B. 2, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
167 See DSIRE RPS Data Spreadsheet, supra note 165.
168 For example, “[i]t has . . . been estimated that RPSs motivated approximately forty-five percent of the
4300 MW of wind power installed in the United States between 2001 and the end of 2004. Ferrey et al., supra
note 74, at 150.
169 Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal
Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 404 (2008); Sovacool &
Cooper, supra note 65, at 88.
170 For example, Pennsylvania requires that 18% be derived from alternative energy sources within fifteen
years after its law took effect, 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1648.3 (West 2008), whereas New York requires
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renewable resources.171 Compliance becomes onerous because utilities do not
necessarily operate within one state and therefore must comply with widely
differing state laws.172 For example, American Electric Power serves
customers in eleven states, three of which have a mandatory RPS.173 Thus, it
must ensure the renewable energy it uses meets the definition and percentage
requirements in all three states. By creating additional compliance costs for
utilities, state RPSs unintentionally inflate electricity prices.174
The patchwork also creates inefficiencies in the markets for RECs. The
differing definitions of renewable energy under state RPSs, including some
requirements for in-state generation, limit a utility’s ability to purchase an REC
from out of state to meet the quota.175 Such restrictions “thwart the economies
of scale that can result from national markets.”176 Additionally, for
technologies using resources widely considered renewable, such as wind and
solar, a specific project may offer investors a good return more because of the
ability to sell the RECs the project generates in numerous states than because
of the merits of the project itself.177
In addition, reliance on state RPSs does not create long-term predictability
because the RPSs themselves are not inherently stable. For example, in several
states, such as Connecticut178 and Maine,179 there have been attempts to roll

utilities to obtain 30% by 2015. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Establishing New RPS Goal and Resolving
Main Tier Issues, Case 03-E-0188, at 10 (Jan. 8, 2010); Fershee, supra note 49, at 82.
171 E.g., Fershee, supra note 49, at 79–80; DSIRE RPS Data Spreadsheet, supra note 165 (summarizing
RPS resource eligibility by state).
172 Marilyn A. Brown & Sharon (Jess) Chandler, Governing Confusion: How Statutes, Fiscal Policy, and
Regulations Impede Clean Energy Technologies, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 472, 502 (2008); see also Fershee,
supra note 49, at 84 (stating that a national RPS would make compliance easier and more predictable).
173 Sovacool, supra note 169, at 455; see also About Us, AM. ELECTRIC POWER, http://www.aep.com/
about (last visited July 1, 2013) (laying out the states in which it operates); DSIRE RPS Data Spreadsheet,
supra note 165 (listing the states that have RPSs). The states with an RPS are Michigan, Ohio, and Texas. Id.
Additionally, four states in which American Electric Power operates—Indiana, Oklahoma, Virginia, and West
Virginia—have a voluntary RPS. Id.
174 Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 88; see also Mormann, supra note 57, at 722 (noting that utilities
normally pass the additional costs of REC procurement on to customers).
175 Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1364
(2010).
176 Brown & Chandler, supra note 172, at 502. One commentator has called the state approach
“anachronistic” because the electric utility industry is becoming more national. Sovacool, supra note 169, at
455.
177 Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 107−08.
178 See Jan Ellen Spiegel, Connecticut Mulls Rollback on Clean Energy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2010, 8:45
AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/Connecticut-mulls-rollback-on-clean-energy/.
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back the states’ RPSs.180 Moreover, there is the potential for constitutional
challenges.181 Dormant Commerce Clause challenges have been brought
against more than one state that requires in-state generation.182 No court has
yet determined whether such statutes violate the Commerce Clause, but the
potential is there, creating uncertainty.183
Thus, although state initiatives, and particularly the RPS, have played a
crucial role in stimulating investment in renewable energy, they also do not
create the long-term, stable environment investors require. This is particularly
problematic in states that do not require long-term contracts with renewableenergy power producers because the benefits of any incentives could
disappear.184 As a result, it is more difficult for renewable energy projects to
secure financing, and the high cost of any financing available unnecessarily
inflates renewable energy prices.
An analysis of Brazil’s experiences in the next Part demonstrates that a
renewable energy goal can play an important role in an investment framework
if implemented uniformly in combination with other tools that create long-term
stability, such as long-term contracts. The combination of these tools
demonstrates government commitment and creates stability.

179 See Maine Passes Ambitious Oil Security Bill, Governor LePage’s RPS Rollback Stalls, GEORGETOWN
CLIMATE CENTER (June 23, 2011), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/maine-passes-ambitious-oil-securitybill-governor-lepage-s-rps-rollback-stalls.
180 See Brendan Demelle, Heartland Institute, ALEC and More Gearing Up to Undermine Renewable
Energy, DESMOGBLOG.COM (June 25, 2012, 9:51 PM), http://www.desmogblog.com/heartland-institute-alecand-more-gearing-undermine-renewable-energy.
181 E.g., Davies, supra note 175, at 1368; Ferrey, supra note 5, at 92.
182 Davies, supra note 175, at 1368.
183 See Lana Chow, The De-Localization Sustainability Initiative: Renewable Energy, SUSTAINABILITY L.
LEWIS & CLARK L. SCH. (Apr. 6, 2011), http://sustainabilityandlaw.com/2011/04/06/the-de-localizationsustainability-initiative-renewable-energy-by-lana-chow/ (discussing challenges brought in Massachusetts and
California); GTH UPDATE Energy: Federal District Court Decisions on Low-Carbon Fuel Standards Affect
the Pacific Northwest, GORDON THOMAS HONEYWELL (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.gth-law.com/files/gth_
update_energy.01.25.2012.pdf (discussing potential for court to rule California mandate unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause).
184 See Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 193; cf. COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at 11−12, 12 n.20
(asserting FITs can help utilities meet RPS mandates in jurisdictions where renewable-energy project
developers cannot secure long-term contracts).
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III. BRAZIL’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO PROMOTE INVESTMENT IN RENEWABLE
ENERGY
Brazil distinguishes itself from the rest of the world in that 43.9% of its
energy supply is renewable.185 Hydropower satisfies approximately 80% of the
country’s electricity needs.186 The risk associated with reliance on hydropower
became clear in 2001 when severe drought necessitated electricity rationing.187
As a result, Brazil set out to diversify its energy mix.188
Since 2002, Brazil has relied on laws requiring long-term contracts for
fixed prices—first through an FIT189 and more recently through energy
auctions—to promote investment in renewable energy.190 These mechanisms
are explored in sections A and B, below. Brazil has also introduced tax
incentives (section C) and other mechanisms, including a national development
bank (BNDES) and national climate change policy (PNMC) (section D), to
complement these laws. These last two measures form an integral part of
Brazil’s framework as BNDES finances many renewable energy projects,191
and the PNMC establishes an overarching goal that requires government
commitment to renewable energy.
Although Brazil has made multiple policy changes, and also uses shortterm tax incentives, its overall framework has evidenced a commitment to
developing the renewable energy industry and has provided investors with
more long-term predictability than in the United States. While the United
States should not simply imitate the framework Brazil created (and likely
cannot given differing political climates), the following study of Brazil’s legal
framework to promote investment in renewable energy can provide the United
States with valuable guidance in modifying its own legal framework.

185 KPMG INT’L, supra note 14, at 10. In comparison, the world average is 14% and among developed
countries it is 6%. Id.
186 LAURA PORTO, MINISTÉRIO DE MINAS E ENERGIA, ENERGIAS RENOVÁVEIS [RENEWABLE ENERGY]
(2007), available at http://www.mme.gov.br/programas/proinfa/galerias/arquivos/apresentacao/VI.pdf.
187 See PSI MEDIA INC., 2010 BRAZIL ENERGY HANDBOOK 11 (2009), available at www.psimedia.info/
handbooks/Brazil_Energy_Handbook.pdf.
188 See id. at 15.
189 See generally supra note 98 (describing FIT policies).
190 See infra Part III.A–B.
191 See RAMÓN FIESTAS, GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL & ABEEÓLICA, ANALYSIS OF THE
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR WIND POWER GENERATION IN BRAZIL 4, 12–13, available at http://gwec.net/
wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Brazil_report_2011.pdf; see also UNEP & BNEF 2011, supra note 4, at 43.
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A. PROINFA: Long-Term Access to the Grid and a Fair Return
In 2002, Brazil established the Incentive Program for Alternative Sources
of Energy (PROINFA).192 Unlike PURPA, the goals of which concerned
general energy conservation,193 PROINFA’s goals specifically included
increasing renewable generation by IPPs.194 To accomplish that goal, the law
guaranteed that state-owned utility Eletrobrás would purchase energy from
IPPs.195 It also required that installations satisfy a minimum national content
rule196 to promote development of a Brazilian manufacturing industry for
renewable energy equipment.197
The law laid out two phases.198 Contracts were to be awarded through calls
to the public under both, but the parameters differed.199 During Phase I,
Eletrobrás was to enter into twenty-year PPAs for a total of 3,300 MW of
installed capacity.200 Different from PURPA, PROINFA required Eletrobrás to
pay power producers prices based on the “economic value” of the technology
used.201 The law set rate floors for each technology202 and the Executive
Branch promulgated further rate guidelines, including an appropriate return on
capital and most related costs.203

192 Lei No. 10.438 [Law No. 10.438], de 26 de Abril de 2002, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
29.04.2002 (Braz.).
193 See supra Part II.A.
194 Law No. 10.438. Eligible renewable resources were limited to biomass, wind, and small hydroelectric.
Id.
195 See id.
196 The national content requirements were 60% during Phase I and 90% during Phase II. See Lei No.
10.762 [Law No. 10.762], de 11 de Novembro de 2003, D.O.U. de 12.11.2003 (Braz.) (amending Law No.
10.438).
197 At the time there was only one manufacturer of wind turbines operating in Brazil. LUIZ BARROSO,
RENEWABLE ENERGY AUCTIONS: THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE 7 (2012), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTENERGY2/Resources/4114191-1328286035673/D2_Luiz_Barroso.pdf.
198 Law No. 10.438.
199 Id.; Law No. 10.762.
200 Lei No. 10.889 [Law No. 10.889], de 25 de Junho de 2004, D.O.U. de 28.06.2004 (Braz.). As enacted,
PROINFA required Eletrobrás to enter into fifteen-year contracts. Law No. 10.438. That requirement changed
to twenty-year contracts in 2004. Law No. 10.889.
201 Law No. 10.438.
202 Law No. 10.762. The floors were originally set at 80% of the average national tariff to the consumer
but were amended in 2003 to: 50% of the average national tariff to the consumer for biomass; 70% for small
hydro; and 90% for wind. Id.; Law No. 10.438. Germany’s FIT legislation, which many countries have copied,
included a similar pricing scheme except that the floors for biomass and small hydro were higher. See Swisher
& Porter, supra note 55, at 193.
203 Decreto No. 5.025 [Decree No. 5.025], de 30 de Março de 2004, D.O.U. de 31.03.2004 (Braz.).
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During Phase II, Eletrobrás was to enter into contracts with power
producers so that renewable energy supplied 10% of the country’s annual
electric consumption within twenty years from the beginning of Phase I.204
Phase II has not been implemented, however, and it is possible that it never
will be given the new regulatory framework discussed in the next section.205
The costs of PROINFA were to be absorbed by the ratepayers.206
B. A Switch in Strategy to Power Auctions
The year 2004 brought a new framework for the power sector—a hybrid
approach that split the sector into regulated and unregulated markets for
different producers and consumers—but maintained the requirement that
suppliers enter into long-term contracts with IPPs.207 Among the goals of the
new model were security of supply, lower tariffs, and a just return to
investors.208 The framework “features a strict planning of the sector”209 and
requires electricity distributors to purchase energy only through competitive
tenders.210
Long-term contracts—between three and fifteen years for existing projects
and between fifteen and thirty-five years for new projects—are awarded
through government auctions.211 Requiring long-term contracts ensures a stable
return to investors and helps finance the sector’s expansion.212 Under the new

204

Law No. 10.438.
BARROSO, supra note 197, at 6; OSVALDO SOLIANO PEREIRA, CENTRO BRASILEIRO DE ENERGIA E
MUDANÇA DO CLIMA, LEAP INTO GREEN GROWTH: PROMOTING CLEAN TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURING
(2011), available at http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/
Policy%20and%20regulatory%20issues%20Brazil.pdf.
206 Law No. 10.438; PEREIRA, supra note 205.
207 Lei No. 10.848 [Law No. 10.848], de 15 de Março de 2004, D.O.U. de 16.03.2004 (Braz.); Country
Analysis Briefs: Brazil, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/cabs/brazil/Full.html (last updated
Feb. 28, 2012).
208 See, e.g., CENTRO DE ESTUDOS DAS SOCIEDADES DE ADVOGADOS, LEGAL GUIDE FOR THE FOREIGN
INVESTOR IN BRAZIL 159 (2006); PEREIRA, supra note 205.
209 CENTRO DE ESTUDOS DAS SOCIEDADES DE ADVOGADOS, supra note 208, at 149.
210 Law No. 10.848; PSI MEDIA INC., supra note 187, at 11. This governs the purchase of all energy, not
just renewable energy, to ensure adequate supply. See LUIZ AUGUSTO BARROSO ET AL., AUCTIONS OF
CONTRACTS AND ENERGY CALL OPTIONS TO ENSURE SUPPLY ADEQUACY IN THE SECOND STAGE OF THE
BRAZILIAN POWER SECTOR REFORM 4–5 (2006), available at www.psr-inc.com/psr/download/papers/Brazil_
paper_GM0205.pdf.
211 Law No. 10.848.
212 CENTRO DE ESTUDOS DAS SOCIEDADES DE ADVOGADOS, supra note 208, at 157.
205
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model, there have been auctions specifically for new renewable energy
projects.213
C. Complementary Tax Incentives
Although the primary impetus behind investment in renewable energy in
Brazil has been programs awarding long-term contracts to IPPs, Brazil has
enacted complementary tax incentives. For example, in 2007, Brazil adopted a
special incentive program to promote investment in infrastructure projects
(REIDI).214 Entities that buy or import new instruments for use in an
infrastructure project are exempted for up to five years from paying two types
of taxes related to that purchase.215
Additionally, there are tax incentives specific to renewable energy. Wind
and solar generating equipment may be exempt from sales tax (ICMS) through
2015.216 This exemption was first adopted in 1997.217 As with the tax credits in
the United States, it is not stable—it has been modified various times since it
was first adopted and has been extended on multiple occasions for only short
periods of time (anywhere from one month to three years at a time).218 Also for
wind equipment there is an exemption from a tax on industrialized products.219
More recently, in April 2012, regulations were adopted allowing solar
plants of up to 30 MW that begin commercial operation by December 31,
2017, a discount of 80% on distribution and transmission tariffs for the first ten
years of operation.220
213 Marília Rabelo Corrêa, Renewable Energy in Brazil - Perspectives, http://65.110.85.160/academy/
magazine/RENEWABLE%20ENERGY%20IN%20BRAZIL%20-%20E-MAGAZINE.pdf (last visited June
17, 2013).
214 Lei No. 11.488 [Law No. 11.488], de 15 de Junho de 2007, D.O.U. de 15.06.2007 (Braz.).
215 Id.
216 Convênio ICMS 75 [Agreement ICMS 75], de 14 de Julho de 2011, D.O.U. de 18.07.2011 (Braz.). It
has been reported that this exemption provides a benefit of up to 17%. Confaz prorroga isenção de ICMS para
energia eólica [Confaz Extends ICMS Exemption for Wind Energy], BRASELCO, http://www.braselco.com.
br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=106:confaz-prorroga-isencao-de-icms-para-energiaeolica&catid=4:noticias&Itemid=4&lang=en (last visited June 1, 2013).
217 Convênio ICMS 101 [Agreement ICMS 101], de 12 de Dezembro de 1997, D.O.U. de 18.12.1997
(Braz.).
218 See Confaz Extends ICMS Exemption for Wind Energy, supra note 216; Convênio ICMS 101/97,
MINISTÉRIO DA FAZENDA, www.fazenda.gov.br/confaz/confaz/convenios/ICMS/1997/CV101_97.htm (last
visited June 1, 2013).
219 Christiana Sciaudone, Brazil Exempts Imported Wind Equipment from 14% Tax, RECHARGE NEWS,
http://www.rechargenews.com/news/americas/article1283053.ece (last updated Nov. 25, 2012).
220 Resolução Normativa No. 481 [Normative Resolution No. 481], de 17 de Abril de 2012, D.O.U. de
20.04.2012 (Braz.); ANEEL Approves Rules to Facilitate the Generation of Energy in Consumer Units,
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D. Development Bank and Climate Change Policy Round Out the Framework
Additional non-tax mechanisms play a significant role in Brazil’s
framework today. One of the most important is BNDES,221 which offers
financing for renewable energy projects.222 Generally, BNDES offers favorable
terms including, for example, sixteen-year loans with interest rates lower than
the central bank benchmark rate.223
Additionally, in December 2009, Brazil adopted the PNMC.224 The PNMC
has among its goals the compatibility of social–economic development,
protection against climate change, and the reduction of GHG emissions.225 It
commits to reducing GHG emissions in Brazil between 36.1% and 38.9% by
2020.226 A presidential decree outlined a plan for accomplishing this goal,
including increased use of electricity generated from renewable resources.227
Thus, over the past decade Brazil has helped ensure that renewable energy
projects could secure financing by guaranteeing investors a fixed return
through a long-term contract228 and by providing cost-effective loans.229
Recently, Brazil has enacted additional measures targeting renewable energy to
complement the long-term contracts. These measures have not been
implemented without error, however. For example, Brazil has undermined its
efforts to some extent by abandoning Phase II of PROINFA230 and by enacting
only short-term tax incentives.231 Nevertheless, the overall commitment the

AGÉNCIA NACIONAL DE ENERGIA ELÉTRICA (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.aneel.gov.br/aplicacoes/noticias_
area/dsp_detalheNoticia.cfm?idNoticia=5461&idAreaNoticia=347.
221 See BNDES, www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/ (last visited July 1, 2013).
222 FIESTAS, supra note 191, at 12–13; see UNEP & BNEF 2011, supra note 4, at 43.
223 See Stephan Nielsen, BNDES Shuts Five Firms Out of Brazil Wind Turbine Market, RENEWABLE
ENERGY WORLD.COM (July 20, 2012), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/07/
bndes-shuts-five-firms-out-of-brazil-wind-turbine-market. In July 2012, BNDES terminated financing for five
large wind-turbine manufacturers in Brazil because they failed to meet the local content rule requiring turbine
makers to source 40% of their components from Brazilian suppliers. Id. This caused Brazil to fall back down
to number ten in the Ernst & Young Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Indices. ERNST & YOUNG
AUG. 2012, supra note 7, at 21.
224 Lei No. 12.187 [Law No. 12.187], de 29 de Dezembro de 2009, D.O.U. de 29.12.2009 (Braz.).
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Decreto No. 7.390 [Decree No. 7.390], de 9 de Dezembro de 2010, D.O.U. de 10.12.2010 (Braz.).
228 See supra Part III.A–B.
229 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
230 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
231 See supra note 218 and accompanying text. Most recently, Brazil has undermined its efforts by
cancelling energy auctions, which contributed to its fall in the May 2013 Ernst & Young Renewable Energy
Country Attractiveness Indices. See supra note 15.
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country has shown to renewable energy has created more long-term
predictability for investors than in the United States. The following Part draws
lessons from Brazil’s experience through an examination of its successes and
failures.
IV. LESSONS FROM BRAZIL’S EXPERIENCES
Brazil’s attempts to diversify its electrical energy matrix earned it
recognition as a renewable energy powerhouse and for its corresponding
increase in planned renewable energy investments.232 Part III’s examination of
Brazil’s legal framework, designed to promote investment in renewable
energy, provides valuable insight into those elements that give investors the
long-term predictability they need to make cost-effective investment
commitments. The United States should not simply copy Brazil because the
most appropriate framework for a particular country depends on the country’s
political, economic, and environmental conditions (and because Brazil’s
framework is not perfect).233 However, the United States should apply the
following four lessons to create an efficient legal framework: (1) long-term
contracts are crucial; (2) prices matter; (3) tax incentives should supplement,
but not be the principal focus of, the framework; and (4) renewable energy use
goals can ensure that contracts are made in a cost-effective manner. These
lessons are discussed below in sections A to D, respectively.
A. Nonutility Power Producers Need Access to Long-Term Contracts
The most stable element of Brazil’s legal framework to promote investment
in renewable energy during the past decade has been the mandatory long-term
contract or PPA.234 Although Brazil’s framework has changed multiple
times—from an FIT and quota under PROINFA to a competitive auction

232 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. In addition to its rapid increase in the rankings as an
attractive country for renewable energy investment between 2009 and 2011, Brazil’s successes have been
demonstrated by the record low prices at which renewable energy has been contracted for. Stephan Nielsen &
Christiana Sciaudone, Wind Power Sells at World’s Lowest Rate in Brazil Auction, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14,
2012, 9:01 PM), www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-14/four-developers-sign-wind-contracts-in-brazil-for282-megawatts.html.
233 Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 315; Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 185.
234 See supra Part III.A–B; cf. Laurens J. de Vries, Mandatory Long-Term Contracts for Renewable
Energy: The Best of Both Worlds?, in 2011 8TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EUROPEAN ENERGY
MARKET (EEM) 586, 589 (2011), available at http://www.nextgenerationinfrastructures.eu/download.php?
field=document&itemID=585188 (noting that Brazil has found the solution to ensuring adequate generating
capacity in long-term contracts).
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system—it has consistently provided renewable-energy power producers with
access to long-term PPAs.235
Long-term contracts mitigate risk by guaranteeing that power producers
receive an established price for a certain amount of generation over the life of
the contract.236 By locking in a buyer and a price, these contracts alleviate
concerns that a power producer will not be able to sell the electricity it
produces and earn a fair return on the investment.237 They allow capitalintensive and risky renewable energy projects to secure financing because
investors can calculate their return and creditors can feel confident that the
borrower will repay any loan extended.238 Thus, a long-term contract provides
the long-term stability investors and creditors need to commit to financing a
renewable energy project.239
A firm commitment to long-term contracting over the past decade has also
added much-needed stability to the investment environment in Brazil. For
various reasons, such as frequent prolongation of PROINFA’s Phase I,
abandonment of Phase II, and short-term extensions of tax benefits, Brazil’s
approach likely created some uncertainty among investors.240 In fact, three
days before the first wind auction in 2009, the sales tax incentive241 was
extended only one month.242 The executive director of wind energy
organization ABEEólica speculated that about 30% of the projects that had
235

See supra Part III.A–B.
See Disputa entre Ceará e Rio Grande do Norte [Dispute Between Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte],
BRASELCO, http://www.braselco.com.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=138%3Adisputa
-entre-ceara-e-rio-grande-do-norte&catid=4%3Anoticias&Itemid=4&lang=en (last visited Feb. 16, 2012); cf.
de Vries, supra note 234, at 588 (asserting that if short-term pricing continues to dominate the electricity
market, investment risk will increase and the unpredictability will discourage the investment needed to reduce
fossil fuel consumption and carbon emissions).
237 See Sérgio Ruck Bueno, Associação prevê redução no preço da energia eólica no leilão A-5
[Association Predicts Price Reduction of Wind Energy], VALOR (Apr. 10, 2011, 3:23 PM), http://www.valor.
com.br/empresas/1035504/associacao-preve-reducao-no-preco-da-energia-eolica-no-leilao-5; Dispute Between
Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte, supra note 236.
238 See COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at viii–ix; see also Wellington Bahnemann, Mudança põe em risco
leilão de energia eólica [Change Puts Wind Energy Auction at Risk], ESTADÃO (Dec. 14, 2009),
http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,mudanca-poe-em-risco-leilao-de-energia-eolica,481524,0.htm
(discussing the need for investors to recalculate project viability after tax credit was not extended); Dispute
Between Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte, supra note 236.
239 See Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 314 (“Regulatory risk can be reduced if policies provide legally
enforceable long-term guarantees.”).
240 See Mallon, supra note 140, at 25 (cautioning against excessive policy change); Bahnemann, supra
note 238 (discussing the potential effect of the short-term sales tax extension on the first wind energy auction).
241 See supra notes 216–18 and accompanying text.
242 Bahnemann, supra note 238.
236
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signed up for the auction would not participate as a result.243 In the end,
however, the auction took place as planned and 1,806 MW were contracted for
at an average price about 21% below the auction’s ceiling price,244 which had
been set based on a continuing sales tax incentive.245
Therefore, Brazil has been able to promote renewable energy development
despite some evidence of unstable policies. Its success is likely due to a
demonstrated overall societal commitment to renewable energy through
continued reliance on long-term contracting,246 as well as the insulation that
those contracts provide from policy changes.247 Even though investors may not
be assured of a sales tax incentive over the life of a project, they can rely on
having a buyer for their energy at a fixed price, which is a greater guarantee
than many investors in the United States receive.
It is important to note that the contract terms must be appropriate for the
country’s investment climate and industry development.248 In Brazil, although
Eletrobrás was able to enter contracts for the full amount of renewable energy
generation required under PROINFA,249 many of the projects contracted for
took many years to build, causing several extensions of PROINFA.250 The
problems were attributed to various causes including developers’ inability to
meet national content requirements for wind turbines and high interest rates.251
These problems were corrected as foreign wind manufacturers entered
Brazil252 and the cost of wind energy fell.253 The repeated extension of
PROINFA, however, likely caused uncertainty in the meantime.254
243

Id.
Press Release, Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, Primeiro leilão de energia eólica do país viabiliza a
construção de 1.805,7 MW [Country’s First Wind Auction Secures Construction of 1,805.7 MW] (Dec. 14,
2009), available at http://www.epe.gov.br/imprensa/PressReleases/20091214_1.pdf.
245 Bahnemann, supra note 238.
246 Cf. Karl Mallon, Ten Features of Successful Renewable Markets, in RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY AND
POLITICS, supra note 55, at 35, 62–64 (arguing that an overarching statement of objective allows for changes to
be made within a policy framework without destabilizing the industry).
247 See Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 314.
248 See UNITED NATIONS ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., FINANCING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION
45–46 (2010), available at http://ynccf.net/pdf/Climate_Finanace/GEE21_GlobalClimateChangeMitigation_
ESE37.pdf (discussing the creation of effective financing mechanisms).
249 See PORTO, supra note 186 (showing that a total of 3,299.40 MW were contracted for under
PROINFA).
250 See FIESTAS, supra note 191, at 5.
251 Edward Russell, Not a Breeze, PROJECT FIN., July 2011, at 43.
252 Gabriela Elizondo Azuela & Luiz Augusto Barroso, Design and Performance of Policy Instruments to
Promote the Development of Renewable Energy: Emerging Experience in Selected Developing Countries 16
(World Bank, Energy & Mining Sector Bd. Discussion Paper No. 22, 2011) (attributing the entrance of foreign
manufacturers to renewable energy auctions). Ultimately, national content requirements appear to have
244
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B. The Price Must Be Right
Brazil’s experience demonstrates not only the importance of locking in a
price, but also of getting that price right. Ultimately, the price offered to
renewable energy projects determines whether a developer will commit to
investing in the project.255
A comparison of the performance of Brazil’s biomass sector under
PROINFA and the auction mechanism suggests that price plays a central role
in encouraging investment in renewable energy projects. PROINFA set price
floors depending on the technology used, with that for biomass as the
lowest.256 The price ultimately set varied by specific source material but was
only about half the price of wind.257 Under this pricing scheme, Eletrobrás’s
request for bids resulted in contracts for less than 700 MW of biomass
energy,258 rather than the 1,100 MW initially allotted.259 The auctions, in
contrast, resulted in 3,515 MW of new biomass capacity by 2010.260 Evidently,
many more biomass projects were contracted for under the competitive auction
system than under PROINFA. Given this, and the emphasis commentators
place on the importance of not setting the price under an FIT too low,261 it
benefitted Brazil to some extent by attracting foreign manufacturers to set up shop in the country, but the
requirements were unrealistic to apply immediately and made it impossible to complete PROINFA on time.
253 See Russell, supra note 251.
254 See Mallon, supra note 140, at 25 (cautioning against excessive policy change).
255 See COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at vii (“A comparison of FIT policies suggests that those that are
most effective in meeting deployment objectives have designed their FIT payments to cover the [renewable
energy] project cost, plus an estimated profit. This effectiveness arises from the fact that developers are
reluctant to invest unless they are relatively certain that the revenue streams generated from overall electricity
sales are adequate to cover costs and ensure a return.” (citations omitted)); Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at
195 (noting that the price is a critical factor of an FIT).
256 Lei No. 10.438 [Law No. 10.438], de 26 de Abril de 2002, D.O.U. de 29.04.2002 (Braz.).
257 See PEREIRA, supra note 205. For example, whereas the price for bagasse was about $.03/kWh, the
price for wind power ranged between $.058 and $.066/kWh. Id.
258 See PORTO, supra note 186, at 6.
259 PEREIRA, supra note 205 (noting that during Phase I, 1,100 MW were allotted to each technology,
including biomass).
260 MAURICIO T. TOLMASQUIM, EMPRESA DE PESQUISA ENERGÉTICA, OUTLOOK FOR ALTERNATIVE
RENEWABLE ENERGY IN BRAZIL (2010), available at http://www.iamericas.org/lajolla/Presentations/Mauricio
%20Tolmasquim.pdf.
261 See, e.g., COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at vii (“A comparison of FIT policies suggests that those that
are most effective in meeting deployment objectives have designed their FIT payments to cover the [renewable
energy] project cost, plus an estimated profit. This effectiveness arises from the fact that developers are
reluctant to invest unless they are relatively certain that the revenue streams generated from overall electricity
sales are adequate to cover costs and ensure a return.” (citations omitted)); Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at
195 (noting that if an FIT’s price is set too low, there will be insufficient market incentive for renewable
energy development to occur).
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seems that at least part of the reason why biomass did not perform well under
PROINFA may have been that the prices were set too low.262 Differently, at
the auctions developers bid their own prices.263
In contrast, the wind industry’s experience suggests that a price that ensures
investors earn a fair return can do wonders for the development of a nascent
industry.264 PROINFA, as amended in 2003, set the highest price floor for
wind of the three types of renewable energy projects targeted.265 Eletrobrás
received enough bids for wind projects such that a portion of the quota
originally allotted for biomass capacity was reallocated to wind projects and
contracts were successfully entered for this additional amount.266
Under the auction mechanism, the prices for wind generation have fallen
drastically—prices granted to wind projects at auctions have been as low as
about 50% lower than PROINFA prices267 and on par with or even lower than
hydroelectricity and natural gas prices.268 These low prices do not mean
necessarily that wind was overpriced under PROINFA.269 As Hamilton Moss
of the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) explained, “Wind
development in Brazil is a perfect demonstration of basic economic
laws . . . . With competition, we pushed the price down. . . . People became
interested in building factories here, so we have a complete chain of producers

262 See PEREIRA, supra note 205 (pointing out that the premium tariff for biomass was very low and that
part of the quota for biomass was reallocated to wind and small hydro); MME desiste de preencher cota de
biomassa no Proinfa [MME Gives Up on Filling Biomass Quota Under PROINFA], JORNALCANA (Feb. 24,
2005, 9:37 AM), http://www.jornalcana.com.br/noticia/Jornal-Cana/9963+MME-desiste-de-preencher-cotade-biomassa-no-Proinfa (reporting that industry blamed the inability to contract for 1,100 MW of biomass
capacity under PROINFA on the low price to be paid by Eletrobrás).
263 Nielsen & Sciaudone, supra note 232.
264 As of 2011, over 97% of all wind power installations in Brazil were PROINFA projects. FIESTAS,
supra note 191, at 5.
265 See Lei No. 10.762 [Law No. 10.762], de 11 de Novembro de 2003, D.O.U. de 12.11.2003 (Braz.).
266 See PORTO, supra note 186 (showing that contracts for 1,422.92 MW of wind power were entered into
under PROINFA). The original allotment to wind power under PROINFA was 1,100 MW. PEREIRA, supra
note 205 (noting that during Phase I, 1,100 MW were allotted to each technology).
267 FIESTAS, supra note 191, at 12.
268 See Renewable Energy World Editors, Price of Wind Lower than Gas, Hydro in Brazil Auction,
RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD.COM (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/
2011/08/price-of-wind-lower-than-gas-hydro-in-brazil-auction. These prices may reflect recent tax incentives,
in part, but they have continued dropping even since the tax incentives were enacted.
269 Although, it has been noted that prices based on average retail prices, as in Brazil, can lead to windfall
profits in the event that electricity prices increase. See COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at 21.
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here now and they have prospered.”270 In other words, the high PROINFA
prices allowed investors to take a risk and the wind industry to gain the
experience it needed to lower costs and compete with more established types
of energy.
While wind’s competitiveness in Brazil is momentous, it is crucial to note
the following: the price of wind fell below those of hydro and natural gas in
late 2011, so it remains to be seen whether all projects will get financed and
built;271 it remains to be seen whether prices will remain that low;272 and Brazil
promoted wind because of the vast wind resources it has273 so replication will
depend on a country’s specific environmental endowment. Despite these
cautions, Brazil’s experience does suggest that a firm commitment to
renewable energy development and competition among power projects can
drive prices down.
Thus, as the varied experiences of wind and biomass in Brazil suggest,
offering renewable-energy power producers an appropriate price is crucial. Just
providing for a long-term contract that locks in a fixed price is not sufficient.
To encourage developers to actually commit to renewable energy projects, the
long-term contract must ensure a price that will allow the project’s investors to
earn a fair return and the creditors to recover the loan.274 Multiple mechanisms
can be used to set the price. In Brazil, under PROINFA, the government set a
premium price for each technology.275 Under the auction system, however, the
government merely sets a ceiling price and power projects bid for contracts. A
270 Herman K. Trabish, How Did Wind Beat the Price of Natural Gas in Brazil?, GREENTECHMEDIA (Aug.
29, 2011), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/how-did-wind-beat-the-price-of-natural-gas-in-brazil
(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Bueno, supra note 237.
271 See G. Cunha et al., Fostering Wind Power Through Auctions: The Brazilian Experience, IAEE
ENERGY F. (Int’l Ass’n for Energy Econ., Cleveland, Ohio), Second Quarter 2012, at 25, 27 (noting that of
seventy-two wind farms auctioned in 2009, construction of fifty-two of them is already behind schedule);
Nielsen & Sciaudone, supra note 232 (“The price is prompting concern that some of the planned wind farms
won’t get built.”).
272 See Nielsen & Sciaudone, supra note 232 (“‘This fall in prices isn’t indicative of where prices for wind
energy [are] going in Brazil.’”).
273 See PORTO, supra note 186 (noting that Brazil has a large proven potential for wind energy use).
274 Cf. UNITED NATIONS ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., supra note 248, at 10 (stating that bankers take
“significant comfort” from FITs).
275 Some commentators have argued that this type of price-setting mechanism has been the most
successful at driving renewable energy development around the world. See, e.g., Peter Lynch, Feed-In Tariffs:
The Proven Road NOT Taken . . . Why?, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD.COM (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.
renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/11/feed-in-tariffs-the-proven-road-not-takenwhy (“The FIT
has proven superior to any other program currently in use around the world . . . .”). As the case of biomass in
Brazil suggests, however, it only works if the price is set accurately. See supra note 262 and accompanying
text.
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competitive system of this sort would be more palatable in the United States
where emphasis is placed on market competition.276
C. Tax Incentives Should Complement Rather than Dominate Other Incentives
Tax incentives aimed at promoting investment in renewable energy may be
a useful component of an overall renewable energy framework because they
help signal government commitment to investors.277 On their own, however,
they are not stable enough to promote continuous investment in renewable
energy.278
That tax incentives perform better as a complement to long-term
contracting than as the crux of a renewable energy framework becomes clear
when comparing the performance of renewable energy programs in Brazil and
the United States. In Brazil, PROINFA’s focus was ensuring a fair return in the
long run; tax incentives played little role.279 PROINFA successfully
encouraged investors to commit resources to renewable energy projects
without relying on tax incentives.280 Their introduction, however, has shown
that they may be helpful in combination with long-term contracting. Over the
years, Brazil has incrementally changed its framework and included tax
incentives; at the same time its renewable energy investment has increased and
Brazil has gained more recognition as a renewable energy powerhouse. Unlike
in the United States, however, even when tax incentives have been in imminent
danger of expiration, Brazil’s system based on auctions for long-term contracts
has been able to retain a majority of planned investments.281
In contrast, in the United States, as tax incentives have become more
important, the United States’ ability to instill confidence in investors has
decreased, resulting in a boom-and-bust investment cycle.282 At the same time,
the United States has lost its status as global leader in new renewable energy

276

See Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 196.
See Bahnemann, supra note 238.
278 Brown & Chandler, supra note 172, at 486 (“Policies that subsidize energy technologies on an
inconsistent and sporadic basis do not motivate rational market behavior.”).
279 See supra Part III.A.
280 Presidential Decree No. 5.025 also worked to ensure that investors did not receive a windfall from
investing in renewable energy projects by requiring those contracts entered into to include a price adjustment
for any incentives that became available. See Decreto No. 5.025 [Decree No. 5.025], de 30 de Março de 2004,
D.O.U. de 31.03.2004 (Braz.).
281 See supra notes 242–45 and accompanying text.
282 See supra Part II.B.
277
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investment.283 Comparing the United States to Brazil, thus, demonstrates that
while tax incentives may form part of a legal framework to promote
investment in renewable energy, they should not be the focus.284
Brazil’s success results from an overall framework that has provided
investors with a relatively high level of long-term predictability regarding their
investment.285 Tax incentives are one piece that has helped stimulate additional
investment, but they have not been the most important component.
Furthermore, when implementing tax incentives it is important to keep in mind
the cautions discussed previously. Tax incentives should not create additional
costs and should be available to all who need them.286 Brazil has accomplished
this by extending sales tax incentives287 rather than relying on tax benefits that
necessitate large incomes or outside investors as the United States does.288
D. Renewable Energy Targets Ensure Contracts Are Made and Minimize Cost
Requiring utilities to only source a minimum amount of electricity from
renewable resources can ensure that renewable-energy power producers get the
financing they need while limiting the cost of the program. For the most part,
renewable electricity is more costly than electricity from conventional
sources.289 So a blanket policy requiring utilities to buy all renewable
electricity that power producers offer like the FITs adopted in some countries
would be costly.290 Requiring utilities to enter into a limited number of
contracts with power producers that use renewable resources can limit the cost.
Brazil has employed various goals related to renewable energy to spur
investment. PROINFA required Eletrobrás to contract for 3,300 MW of
renewable energy during Phase I.291 While placing a cap on the amount of

283

See supra note 6 and accompanying text. While the United States regained the position of most
attractive country for renewable energy in May 2013, it is impossible to say whether this will continue, as the
increase in the rankings is a departure from the trend of recent years. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
284 Even if the political will exists to commit to long-term tax incentives, the other concerns regarding tax
incentives discussed previously remain. See supra text accompanying notes 117–28.
285 See Mallon, supra note 246, at 64 (discussing the importance of an overall framework).
286 See supra notes 117–22 and accompanying text.
287 See supra text accompanying notes 216–19.
288 See supra text accompanying notes 121–26.
289 David R. Baker, Renewable Energy Costs Are Starting to Come Down, SFGATE (Feb. 4, 2012, 4:00
AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2012/02/03/BUMP1N30MP.DTL.
290 See Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 196 (discussing greater cost impacts on some utilities than
others in Germany).
291 See supra Part III.A.
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renewable energy that Eletrobrás had to contract for under PROINFA may
have inhibited more rapid industry growth than otherwise could have occurred
without a cap,292 it also helped minimize total program costs.293
Although Phase II, which would have required 10% of electricity to come
from renewable resources, was never implemented, Brazil has not abandoned
the concept of establishing a goal pertaining to renewable energy use. The
PNMC requires Brazil’s people and businesses to reduce GHG emissions in
part through the increased use of renewable energy.294 This policy can work
together with Brazil’s other incentives to ensure a sufficient amount of
renewable energy is purchased. Given Brazil’s focus on a few types of
renewable resources and the current ability of those resources to compete on
price with conventional power generation,295 this mechanism appears sufficient
for Brazil for now. Even if the PNMC does not provide as much incentive as
an RPS, it does add stability to the framework by signaling government
commitment to investors, even when individual elements of the framework are
modified.296
Comparing the United States’ performance with that of Brazil further
highlights the importance of using a renewable energy goal in conjunction with
long-term contracting requirements. The ability of states to meet their RPS
goals has varied. Texas, for example, required long-term contracts when its
RPS was implemented and very rapidly got ahead of schedule in meeting its
goal.297 In contrast, those states without long-term contracting requirements
had more trouble meeting their mandates.298 These examples demonstrate that
an RPS works best in conjunction with other policies to create a cost-effective
framework.

292 Cf. Mallon, supra note 140, at 23 (“Caps are great for limiting problems, but are a nightmare for
building solutions. . . . Once capacity meeting the long-term energy cap is in place, a complete halt in activity
will ensue.”).
293 According to a discussion paper by Gabriela Elizondo Azuela and Luiz Augusto Barroso, “the total
annual cost originating from [renewable energy] generation triggered by both PROINFA and auctions is
estimated at [$]1.38 billion per year and [$]911 million per year, respectively.” Azuela & Barroso, supra note
252, at 29. The impact on consumer tariffs, once the costs are spread across ratepayers, is negligible at 1.35%
from PROINFA and 0.6% from auctioned capacity. Id.
294 See supra Part III.D.
295 See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
296 See Mallon, supra note 246, at 62–64.
297 Martinot et al., supra note 67.
298 Id.
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The United States certainly should not merely imitate Brazil’s framework.
First, a framework must be appropriate for a country’s conditions.299 Second,
Brazil has not created a completely stable investment environment. In some
ways, instability in Brazil has similar causes as in the United States—a lack of
commitment to a specific law. Furthermore, a start-and-stop investment
environment is somewhat inherent to the auction mechanism that Brazil has
chosen because new capacity can only receive contracts under periodic
auctions.300
Nevertheless, Brazil’s overall commitment to providing power producers
with access to long-term contracts, complemented by other mechanisms, has
demonstrated that Brazil is serious about renewable energy.301 Furthermore,
because power producers receive long-term contracts, investors and creditors
need worry less about potential future changes to the country’s energy
policy.302
The United States, in contrast, has largely failed to quell investor fears for
more than a couple of years at a time.303 Part V recommends a new framework
for the United States based on the lessons from Brazil. The framework’s focus
is mandatory long-term contracts entered through a market-based, competitive
process to meet the requirements of a national RPS.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
To recover its position as global leader in renewable energy investment and
ensure long-term sustainable economic growth, the United States must revamp
its legal framework to encourage continuous investment in renewable energy.
Under this new recommended framework, the federal government must assert
itself more because, as one commentator has said, “when environmental
problems are national or international in scope, only interactive federalism
captures all of these benefits while minimizing the deficiencies.”304
299

See Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 315.
Azuela & Barroso, supra note 252, at 40.
301 Cf. Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 196 (“The key to a booming European wind market, however,
has been policies that have been relatively stable and long term . . . .”).
302 See Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 314.
303 Some states do a better job than others in filling the gaps in the federal framework and addressing
investors’ concerns.
304 Sovacool, supra note 169, at 475; accord Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60
EMORY L.J. 877, 881 (2011) (advocating “enhanced local authority” in the context of minimum federal
regulatory standards “to ameliorate the negative consequences of regulatory competition”). But see Brian
Jansen, Comment, Community Wind Power: Making More Americans Energy Producers Through Feed-In
300
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The centerpiece of this new legal model should be a national RPS requiring
electric utilities to source a specific percentage of the electricity they supply to
consumers through long-term contracts with nonutility power producers using
renewable resources.305 To minimize any costs associated with compliance,
however, a utility should be allowed to generate its own electricity using
renewable resources if it can do so more cheaply than the competing nonutility
power producers. Once a utility reaches the minimum percentage, it could
enter into more long-term contracts with renewable-energy power producers,
or generate more electricity from renewables itself, but would not be required
to. Other pieces of the current legal framework, such as tax incentives, could
form part of the new legal framework but should no longer be the primary
federal incentive to renewable energy development.
This suggested framework would provide the long-term predictability that
renewable-energy project developers need to secure low-cost financing. In that
respect, it would reduce many unnecessary development costs that the current
legal framework creates, leading to more investment and lower renewable
energy prices.306 First, section A discusses the long-term PPAs that utilities
would be required to enter with nonutility power producers that use renewable
resources. Section B then analyzes the role the national RPS would play in
creating a competitive process to minimize the cost of contracting with
renewable-energy power producers. Lastly, section C addresses potential
concerns regarding the recommended legal framework, including jurisdictional
issues and increased electricity costs.
A. A Framework Based on Long-Term Contracting
To create a stable investment environment in which potential renewable
energy projects can secure financing on an ongoing basis, the federal legal
framework should require utilities to enter into long-term PPAs with nonutility
power producers that use renewable resources.307 While many commentators
have discussed the benefits and drawbacks of an FIT for the United States, few

Tariffs, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 329, 343 (2011) (arguing that energy is a regional issue so “state legislators
are better positioned to create and pass lasting policies”).
305 See Martinot et al., supra note 67 (noting that RPS policies do not work where long-term contracts are
not available).
306 See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 89 (advocating a national RPS because the state-based
approach dramatically distorts private investment).
307 E.g., COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at 72–73.
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have focused on the long-term contract as the lynchpin of a successful FIT.308
Some commentators recommend that the United States adopt an FIT,309 while
others suggest that a European-style FIT, based on a mandated premium price,
would not work in the United States for political reasons.310
Brazil’s experience with both an FIT (PROINFA) and an auction
mechanism suggests that the most important aspect of an effective legal
framework is providing renewable-energy power producers with long-term
contracts at a sufficient fixed price.311 Locking in the price is crucial because,
although the technology itself should get cheaper over time, the bulk of the
costs associated with most renewable energy projects are up-front capital
costs.312 The expected return, therefore, is based on the capital costs and the
amount of electricity a renewable-energy power producer anticipates it can
sell.313 Brazil’s auctions have been successful despite not guaranteeing a
premium price.314 In fact, the competition that the auction mechanism creates
has driven prices down, but the assurance of a fixed buyer and price provides
the stability investors need to commit.315
Ideally, most long-term contracts required under this new framework
should be for at least twenty years because that is the lifespan of many
renewable energy projects.316 For certain technologies, however, the optimal
contract length may differ.317 For example, developers of technologies that use
a fuel source like biomass may prefer a shorter contract that aligns with their
fuel supply contract.318 The new model should respect these technological
differences.319 Tailoring the framework to the needs of the various
308 E.g., Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 195–97; Jansen, supra note 304, at 343 (advocating that
states adopt feed-in tariffs); Lynch, supra note 275 (advocating for a national FIT).
309 For examples, see Jansen, supra note 304, at 343, who advocated that states adopt feed-in tariffs;
Lynch, supra note 275, who advocated for a national FIT; and Craig Morris, Feed-In Tariffs Needed After
Grid Parity, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD.COM (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/
news/article/2011/02/feed-in-tariffs-needed-after-grid-parity.
310 Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 196.
311 See de Vries, supra note 234, at 589; cf. COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at v (asserting that FITs are
successful in part because they provide long-term purchase agreements at fixed prices).
312 E.g., Gerrard, supra note 17, at 12.
313 Mallon, supra note 246, at 52–54.
314 See supra Part IV.B.
315 See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
316 Mallon, supra note 140, at 23. Wind projects in Brazil generally receive twenty-year contracts. Dispute
Between Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte, supra note 236.
317 See COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at 73.
318 Id.
319 See Mallon, supra note 246, at 45.
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technologies would allow developers to get the lowest cost financing possible,
resulting in the least price impact on utilities and ratepayers.320
Allowing potential renewable energy projects in all states access to longterm PPAs would allow investors to determine whether a project will provide
them with a sufficient return and therefore make economic sense. A long-term
contract reduces the risk associated with making long-term investment
decisions because it isolates the renewable energy project from potential
changes to revenue streams, whether market induced or driven by politics.321
For example, under the current system, an investor runs the risk that a state
may reduce its RPS or that a utility’s avoided cost may fall during the lifetime
of the renewable energy project.322 If the electricity generated by the renewable
energy project is more expensive than that generated from conventional
sources of fuel, the power producer without a long-term contract may be forced
to accept a price that does not even cover the project’s costs, let alone provide
a return to investors. The potential for this scenario makes it difficult for
nonutility power producers to secure financing and often drives up the cost of
the financing that is available.323
PURPA caselaw provides precedent for enforcing long-term contracts
entered into between utilities and nonutility power producers, regardless of
changes that occur in the marketplace. For example, in 1995, in Freehold
Cogeneration Associates v. Board of Regulatory Commissioners, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that under PURPA, a state regulator may not
modify in any way a previously implemented PPA between a QF and a
utility.324 In that case, the regulator had ordered the QF to renegotiate its
contract with the utility after the utility’s avoided cost fell well below the price
contracted for.325 The court reasoned that Congress had intended to exempt
QFs from state and federal utility rate regulations so the state regulator was
preempted from changing the terms of the contract even if it would generally
have the authority to do so under its administrative power.326 Thus, requiring
320

See id. at 53–54.
Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 314.
322 See supra Part II.A and text accompanying notes 179–83.
323 Requiring long-term contracts also has the potential benefit of stabilizing electricity prices in the long
run. See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 102. By entering into long-term contracts with renewableenergy power producers, utilities can hedge against volatile fossil fuel prices, stabilizing long-term electricity
rates. Id.
324 44 F.3d 1178, 1194 (3d Cir. 1995).
325 Id. at 1183.
326 Id. at 1192.
321
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utilities to enter into long-term contracts with a fixed price would not be
inconsistent with current PURPA implementation in those states that require
long-term contracts. Yet it would require the federal government to assert more
authority by requiring, rather than permitting, long-term contracts in all states.
B. Reinforcing the Framework and Minimizing Costs Through a National
RPS
Because there is potential for higher costs associated with renewable
energy, utilities should not have to enter into a contract with all nonutility
power producers that generate electricity from renewable resources that might
request one. Rather, the federal government should adopt a national RPS to
ensure utilities enter into long-term contracts for a minimum amount of
renewable energy or the corresponding RECs, or generate that minimum
amount themselves.327 This national RPS should set a floor requiring that a
minimum percentage of electricity that a utility provides to its consumers be
produced using renewable resources. It should also allow individual states to
set higher percentages if they desire.328 Providing a floor but allowing a higher
percentage requirement would ensure a nationwide minimum standard, while
allowing states with more renewable resources to encourage additional
investment.329 Congress set a similar standard in the Clean Air Act of 1965,
allowing California to establish air pollution emission standards for vehicles.330
By setting a floor in that case, Congress “ensured that the states could continue
to innovate while also mandating that all states moved forward in promoting
cleaner air.”331
The RPS under the new framework should set a long-term goal with annual
incremental increases to encourage continuous investment.332 Renewable
327

Cf. Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-In Tariffs to Meet U.S. Renewable
Electricity Targets, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 73, 74 (“Although RPS and feed-in tariffs are viewed as
mutually exclusive policies in Europe, U.S. policy developments indicate that innovative hybrid approaches
are possible in which feed-in tariffs are integrated into or established in tandem with existing renewable
targets.”).
328 At least one commentator suggests that post-2004 Congress favors federal ceilings over floors as they
prevent state policy makers from “holding the reins of environmental policymaking.” Sovacool, supra note
169, at 416. While this may be the case in general, establishing a floor would avoid interfering with states that
already have higher standards and further encourage investment in renewables. The commentator himself
recommends a floor in the case of renewable energy. Id. at 472.
329 See id. at 472–73.
330 Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 141.
331 Id.
332 Id. at 134; see Mallon, supra note 140, at 23.

CHACON GALLEYSPROOFS1

2013]

7/11/2013 2:01 PM

LONG-TERM CONTRACTING

1607

energy projects often have a lifetime of about twenty years.333 If the goal were
set for less than twenty years, there would be a “flurry of activity and massive
industry growth for the first few years” to meet the cap.334 “Once capacity
meeting the long-term energy cap is in place,” new investment in renewable
energy projects would likely halt because no new capacity would be needed.335
Such a scenario would provide little more incentive than the current boom–
bust framework to build up a strong domestic manufacturing industry, so the
United States would not be able to reap the full benefits of renewable energy
development.
To reduce the negative effects of the current system of state RPSs, the law
should clearly define the type of renewable resources that would count toward
the RPS. This definition should be all-inclusive and allow for technological
change.336 Defining fuel sources that are eligible, rather than specific
technologies, could accomplish this goal.337 Creating a broad definition would
also ensure that projects that produce electricity to fulfill the requirements
could be developed in all states.338 This is important because a major concern
expressed about adopting a national RPS is that not all states are similarly
endowed.339 Regardless, the RPS should not include any in-state requirements
because that tends to drive up the price of compliance.340
By establishing a uniform definition of renewable resources and allowing
for out-of-state purchases, a national RPS would make compliance easier and
more predictable than the current state RPSs. Companies that reside in more
than one state would be able to comply by using the renewable energy that
makes the most economic sense for the company and ratepayers rather than
based on what specific renewable resource counts under each state’s RPS.341
This would reduce compliance costs for utilities.342 Furthermore, because all
renewable resources would count toward the requirement in all states, investors
could make decisions based on the economics of the specific project rather
333

Mallon, supra note 140, at 23.
Id.
335 Id.
336 Mallon, supra note 246, at 49.
337 Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 135.
338 Id. at 147–48.
339 Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1442
(2010); cf. Mallon, supra note 246, at 49 (asserting that the appropriate mix of technologies varies from
country to country).
340 See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
341 See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
342 Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 94.
334
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than based on those RECs that would have the greatest market potential as may
happen now.343
Not only could a national RPS reduce compliance costs, but also it would
provide investors with more long-term stability than a state RPS because it
would reduce the potential for legal challenges.344 As discussed above, in many
states there have been challenges against the RPS, both at the legislative level
and by utilities, for constitutional reasons.345 By implementing a clear mandate
with specific permission for the states to adopt more stringent requirements,
much of the concern about the stability of the state RPSs would be eliminated,
reducing risk for investors.
In addition to mitigating the negative effects of the current state patchwork,
adoption of a national RPS would eliminate many of the current pricing issues
under PURPA. PURPA prohibits requiring utilities to purchase energy from a
QF for a cost that exceeds the avoided cost.346 PURPA does not prohibit
utilities from agreeing to a fixed rate above the utility’s avoided cost, but a
utility worried about its overall profitability is not likely to agree to a higher
rate if not required.347 Mandating that electric utilities source renewable energy
through long-term contracts with nonutility power producers would require
utilities to negotiate contracts for a fair price that allows the projects to secure
cost-effective financing. At the same time, allowing a utility to invest in its
own renewable generation, if it can show it is more cost effective for the
ratepayers, will limit any unnecessary costs that could arise if utilities did not
have that option.
Utilities would be allowed to contract with the power producers of their
choosing as long as they meet the minimum requirements. Thus, unlike the
FITs that have been implemented in many countries, the recommended
framework would maintain a competitive process through which utilities
would enter into contracts with those renewable-energy power producers that
best meet their needs.348

343
344

See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 93 (discussing uncertainty regarding duration of state-based

RPSs).
345

See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text.
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (2006).
347 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text; cf. Dewey, supra note 99, at 1113 (arguing it is
difficult to secure a long-term contract from a utility worried about providing consumers with low rates).
348 See supra note 98.
346
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Lastly, to ensure that the new framework provides investors with the
maximum amount of stability and accomplishes the goal of increasing
renewable energy consumption in the United States, it would be crucial to
implement an enforcement mechanism.349 This mechanism may consist of a
national REC trading scheme that allows utilities to track the amount of
renewable energy they buy, as well as penalties to be paid by those utilities that
do not comply with the requirements.350
C. Potential Challenges to the Proposed Framework
Whether the federal government should promote renewable energy and, if
so, the design of an appropriate renewable energy policy is the topic of much
debate. One central issue regards the economic feasibility of using renewable
energy.351 Politicians are often concerned about raising electricity prices by
mandating renewable energy use.352 Another contention is whether requiring
the use of renewable energy should fall on the shoulders of the federal
government or the states.353 Many opponents of a national RPS, for example,
believe that state legislatures and agencies are better positioned to make
determinations regarding the use of renewable energy within their state’s
borders.354
These debates aside, until now, the federal government has chosen to
promote renewable energy, and primarily does so through tax incentives.355
Furthermore, a majority of the states also promote renewable energy.356 As this
Comment demonstrates, however, the current legal framework to promote
renewable energy is not as efficient or cost-effective as it could be. The legal
framework this Comment recommends creates long-term predictability for
investors and reduces many of the unnecessary costs associated with the
current framework, while respecting state and federal boundaries.
The recommended framework would ensure that renewable energy
contributes to the current energy matrix in as cost-effective a manner as

349

See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 139.
Id. at 138.
351 E.g., Mary Ann Ralls, Congress Got It Right: There’s No Need to Mandate Renewable Portfolio
Standards, 27 ENERGY L.J. 451, 452 (2006).
352 E.g., id.; Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 94.
353 E.g., Ralls, supra note 351, at 455–56.
354 E.g., id.
355 See supra Part II.B.
356 See supra Part II.C.
350
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possible. Although the prospect of a utility paying above its avoided cost for
renewable energy may be concerning, requiring utilities to enter into long-term
contracts with nonutility power producers would help drive renewable energy
prices down in two respects. First, by reducing investment risk, long-term
contracts would drive down the required return on investment and cost of debt
for power producers.357 In turn, renewable-energy power producers should be
able to reduce the prices they charge to utilities. Thus, ratepayers would pay a
rate closer to the true cost associated with use of renewable resources while
reaping all of the benefits they offer, rather than paying more money to
investors for assuming risk.
Additionally, the national RPS proposed, rather than a blanket mandate that
utilities buy electricity from all renewable energy projects (as some FITs do),
should drive down prices by creating competition between renewable-energy
power producers. This proposal specifically requires utilities to contract with
nonutility power producers unless they can show that investing in their own
renewable energy generation is more cost-effective. This requirement will
incentivize power producers to continue innovating to generate the lowest cost,
yet still reliable, renewable energy possible as they will be competing for
contracts. As the wind energy industry has demonstrated in Brazil, this
competition should drive the creation of a competitive domestic renewable
energy industry with improved technology, lowering capital costs for
renewable energy projects.358
Under the Federal Power Act, FERC has the power to regulate rates for
interstate and wholesale transmission of electricity.359 In doing so, it can
“shape the energy market and affect all stakeholders.”360 As one commentator
has described it, “The act creates a ‘bright line’ between state and federal
jurisdiction with wholesale power sales falling on the affirmative federal side
of the line.”361 Where the federal government has acted in this sphere, states
are prohibited from acting.362 Wholesale power transactions refer to sales that
are made “to any person for resale.”363 Sales by power producers to utilities fit
this definition. Thus, FERC has authority over sales by renewable-energy

357
358
359
360
361
362
363

Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 314.
See supra notes 267–70 and accompanying text.
See supra note 74.
Ferrey et al., supra note 74, at 180.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 181.
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power producers to utilities.364 The recommended framework does recognize,
however, that some states may want to encourage faster development of
renewable energy and allows them to adopt a higher requirement to do so.
Different from in Brazil today, under this new legal framework, utilities
would be on the hook for supplying a certain amount of electricity generated
by renewable resources. As a result the utilities would ensure that the projects
they contract with are feasible and the prices not so low that the project could
not secure financing. Also, power producers would only get paid for actually
providing electricity, so they would be incentivized to maintain their plants.
The recommended legal framework, therefore, would eliminate
unnecessary financing costs associated with the current framework to ensure
that ratepayers enjoy the benefits of using renewable energy to the full extent
possible. By providing nonutility power producers increased access to longterm contracts and stimulating competition that would help drive prices down,
the new framework would also reduce the current reliance on tax incentives.
CONCLUSION
The current legal framework for encouraging investment in renewable
energy in the United States is inefficient in that it does not provide investors
with the long-term predictability they need and increases the costs of available
financing.365 Rather than creating an environment that fosters continuous
investment and the building of a national renewable-energy manufacturing
industry, reliance on tax credits and state RPSs has led to a start-and-stop
investment climate.366
To take advantage of the environmental and economic benefits that
renewable energy provides, and to permanently regain its place as global
leader in renewable energy investment, the United States must reassert its
commitment to renewable energy and revamp its legal framework. This
Comment recommends a new legal framework consisting of both a national
RPS and a requirement that utilities enter into long-term contracts with
nonutility power producers that use renewable resources to meet the RPS
requirement, unless they can generate cheaper renewable energy themselves.

364
365
366

Id.
See Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 185.
See supra Part II.B–C.
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An examination of Brazil’s experience over the past decade suggests that
long-term contracting can lead to rapid development of renewables.367 A
national RPS would ensure that the contracting requirement is implemented in
a cost-effective manner and that the renewable energy industries continue to
improve upon current technologies. While additional measures such as tax
incentives could serve as complementary elements to send positive signals to
investors about the United States’ commitment to developing renewable
energy, Brazil has demonstrated that a country committed to renewable energy
need not have myriad and complicated policies to stimulate investment.368
Rather, the laws and policies it has in place must be clear and effective.
It is important to keep in mind that the recommended framework deals only
with providing efficient incentives to investors. To truly stimulate more rapid,
continuous, and efficient renewable energy development, a country such as the
United States must complete its assessment of other areas of the law affecting
the development and use of renewable energy, including how hospitable an
approach it has to matters such as siting, environmental permitting, and
transmission grid issues.369
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